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CHAPTER

I

SIR ISAAC NEWTON IS DEAD

Education is experiencing seventy years later
the same upheaval that the science of physics underwent
at the beginning of this century.

The old, Newtonian

notions of Space and Time, previously regarded as so

evident they needed no further examination, were in fact

re-examined by one Albert Einstein; and they promptly
fell apart.

Absolutes vanished; in their place were dif-

ferent systems of meaning, all valid relatively.
same thing is going on in education now.

The

In both fields

the result of the upheaval in the concepts of space and

time is a redefinition of what it means to know anything.

The Newtonian concept of Space died long ago in
physics, but it has gasped on in education until almost
now.

The concept was that Space was a pure, universal

vacuum:

objective, abstract, uniform, neutral.

Anything

might be "put into" it or "taken out" of it, but that
space would remain the same.

It had no shape, nor indeed

any function other than to "contain" whatever the Maker

chose to fill it up with.

That description of Newtonian space is also

a

des-

cription of almost every classroom anyone alive in America

2

today has ever set foot in.

being absolute Space,
acter.

Those classrooms approximate

They differ in size, not in char-

The cube shape of the rooms merely emphasizes the

abstract, geometric quality of that space.

Anything can

be put into it or taken out of it, the Space itself goes
on forever.

Also -- since no two things can be in the same

Newtonian space at the same time

—

the walls of the class-

room are nothing more than necessary and natural boundaries

between things that are necessarily and naturally distinct
from one another.
space is

,

seven-year-old space is not where twelve-year-

old space is
is,

English space is not where History

,

principal space is not where teacher space

nor teacher space where pupil space is.

Everything is

distinct, placed at different points and occupying different

volumes

but everything is ultimately contained in the same

,

neutral, impersonal, objective, intellectual, absolute

Newtonian Space.
A considerable number of contemporary educational

reforms and experiments are, implicitly or explicitly, an

attack on that kind of space.
attacks.

Some are quite physical

The Open Space approach literally tears down walls

to achieve a freer, less homogenized, more personalized kind
of space.

The Open Classroom approach allows students to

determine how space

v/ill

be used.

The School Without Walls

approach, like Work-Study terms on the college level, simply
moves the learning theater outside any kind of classroom

3

space at all.

Learning space now is the city, the factory,

the theater, the park:

pressionistically.

space construed concretely, im-

The increasing use of electronic media,

too, involves a physical attack on the Newtonian classroom,

making it possible. for two worlds -- that of the viewer
and that on the screen
same time.

—

to inhabit the same space at the

Not all the incursions against Newtonian Space

in the schools are so obviously physical, however.

In the

early days of the current push against educational fragmentation, the rise of team teaching brought about a limited

transformation of school space.

Putting together different

age- and IQ-groups in the same classes is intended to have
the same kind of effect.

And the quality of schoolroom

space has also been changed by the removal of that all-but-

visible line used to separate teacher space from student
space.

The cumulative effect of these changes has been to

destroy what traditionally was meant by "space" in education.
In education as in physics, the assault on Time
has-

accompanied the assault on Space.

Newton at the

beginning of the Principia wrote that "absolute, true
and mathematical time, of itself, and from its own nature,

flows equably without relation to anything external."

That is as perfect a definition as, we will ever have of

old-fashioned school-style bell time.

Almost everything

going on in contemporary education is an attempt to be
rid of it.

Such now-conventional devices as back-to-

back scheduling and flexible scheduling go a small distance toward making school time less "absolute, true and

mathematical."

The more adventuresome experiments in

the Integrated Day programs and in the use of a modular

credit system and of independent study go still farther
towards breaking down a kind of time that "flows equably

without relation to anything."

Still more subtly and

with more far-reaching implications, attempts are being
made to reunite the psychomotor, affective, and cognitive aspects of the learning process

,

by trying to let

them work simultaneously instead of consecutively.

The

old way was to have a time for the mind (the academic

subjects), another time for the feeling (the arts, etc.),
and another time for the body

(crafts, athletics).

It was no small thing to unseat Newton in the world

of physics, and it is no small thing to unseat him in the

For what collapses with Newton is,

world of education.

finally, not just a parcel of unexamined assumptions about

space and time.

What collapses are still more basic as-

sumptions about the nature of reality and of the mind and
of their relationship to each other.

The Newtonian mind

lives in absolute space and time, observes things within

such space and time

,

measures events against such space
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and time.

But the post-Newtonian mind creates its own

That is

—

time

,

the very notions of space and

whether Newton's or anyone else's

—

are them-

selves products of the human mind, and as such are inter-

pretations and transformations of reality*
metaphors.

They are

The farthest-reaching implications of Einstein's

revolution in physics was that all scientific categories
are free creations of the mind.

The farthest-reaching

implication of contemporary movements in education is that
everything we know is a creation of the mind that knows
The attack on traditional Space and Time is ultimately

it.

an attack on the mind as a passive seer of predetermined

reality.

The attack rests, then, implicitly on the stag-

gering assumption that the mind makes what it knows, and

therefore can unmake it, or remake it.
"The mind is its own place," and it plays with

reality endlessly.

Jean Piaget has watched meticulously

how little children structure and restructure their responses to their environments -- structure and restructure

reality
Jr.

.

Along a similar line, a man named Adelbert Ames,

whom both Whitehead and Dewey considered to be one of

,

this century's most important thinkers,^

conducted

The Morning Notes of Adelbert
^Hadley Cantril, ed.
Rutgers University Press,
Ames, Jr. (New Brunswick, N.J.;
1960
p. V.
,

)

,

;

.

^

.
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experiments on visual perception until his death in
1955,
and reached some conclusions that can stand as a
nearly

definitive statement of what the post—Newtonian mind is
like

...what an. observer is perceptually
aware of is -1.
His own unique interpretation
of the significance to him of
environmental conditions from
his unique point of observation
and behavioral center, and
2.
is
sic different from what
any other observer can be perceptually aware of, and
3.
that his perceptions are not
the result of a causal chain
of events originating in the
environment but are his own contribution to the perceptual
situation, and may or may not
correspond to what he is looking
at as it is perceived and known
to others
(

)

.

.

.

Because Ames' own statements of the conclusions
he reached were never set down systematically and exist

only in the form of rather scattered notes

,

we will let

two of his most devoted admirers paraphrase and organize

those conclusions here:
.we do not get our perceptions from
Our perceptions
the "things" around us.
come from us ...
Secondly, it seems clear from the
.

.

Ames studies that what we perceive is

2

Ibid

•

f

p.

136

.

,

.
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largely a function of our previous
experiences, our assumptions, and our
purposes ....
Third, we are unlikely to alter
our perceptions until and unless we
are frustrated in our attempts to do
something based on them.
Fourth, since our perceptions come
from us and our past experience, it is
obvious that each individual will
perceive what is "out there" in a
unique way ....
Fifth, perception is, to a much
greater extent than previously imagined,
a function of the linguistic categories
available to the perceiver
Sixth, the meaning of a perception
is how it causes us to act....^
.

.

.

.

.

The educational reforms which have already swept

away the outmoded Newtonian concepts of Time and Space
have still another task to perform, one even more farreaching.

Put negatively, the task is to leave behind

once and for all the Newtonian mind that created those

concepts in the first place.

Put positively, the task

is to work out what the post-Newtonian, Amesian kind of

mind is, how it operates, and how to help its development
through the services of the educational institution.

Ac-

cordingly, the purpose of the present study is to present
a practical model of the workings of that mind,

and there-

by to point a direction for the on-going educational reform.

The model envisioned here operates exactly and

^Neil Postman and Charles Weingartner, Teaching as
Dell Publishing Company, 1969)
a Subersive Activity (N.Y.:

p.'W^
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as the Ames studies have discovered the mind to

work.

But the hope here is to be more operational than

Ames, who was content to remain purely a researcher and a

laboratory experimenter.
The main rdea of the present work is that the mind

creates meanings for itself by making metaphors

,

and in

altered circumstances it recreates meanings for itself by

making new metaphors.

Metaphor is the device by which the

mind actively structures its perceptions of reality.

A

metaphor is the comparison of one thing or concept to another,
a

connecting of one to the other.

Or, as Webster defines

it, a metaphor is "a figure of speech founded on resem-

blance, by which a word is transferred from an object to

which it properly belongs to another in such a manner that
a

comparison is implied though not formally expressed."
A metaphor is, then, a way of looking at some piece

of reality or other, a way of structuring perception, a

free creation of the mind.

Largely because of his past

experience, a person will tend to favor one metaphor over
another.

The metaphors that work for one person may not

work for another, and may even not work for their creator
in altered circumstances

—

although their creator will

cling to them for as long as he can, out of laziness,
habit, fear, or aesthetic preference.

Since metaphors

control the way we see reality, they therefore wind up

,
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controlling how we behave in it as well, because they
open up or close off the number of active relationships
we can have to it.
It may be -- indeed,

the present study

accept Ames

s

it is the main thesis of

that if education were fully to

post— Newtonian model of how the mind works

we would wind up with an education in which metaphoric
thought would occupy the central place.

In this study

we will explore metaphor as a potentially useful tool
in education for helping people to structure and, when

necessary, to restructure their vision of reality.

CHAPTER

I

I

THE CREATION AND COMMUNICATION OF MEANINGS:
THE STRUCTURING OF EXPERIENCE
In the random and excessive flow of reality

the mind has to find meanings, or rather, create them.
In and of itself "reality" means nothing.

Only when first

biologically and then mentally we sort it out into patterns, into repetitions, into familiar clusters, does it

begin to mean something.

Ultimately the meaning of

things is in the mind, not in the things.

Confronting

the universe of raw experience without mental structures
is very much like looking at photographs for the first

time.

People in primitive tribes are said not to recog-

nize themselves or anything else in photographs because

the black and white splotches on the paper simply do not

make patterns to them.

anything to them.

Consequently they do not mean

Such people do not see themselves as

black-and-white, nor as two dimensional, nor as fitting
onto a

4

X

5

glossy piece of something.

Thus, if the

meaningful pattern is not in the mind, it does not exist
at all.

The photograph is seen as a photograph by a mind

prepared to organize in that. way the sense impressions it
causes.

But the same item is seen as chaotic grays on a

shiney field of white by

a

mind not so prepared.
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The process of creating meanings by mentally
struc-

turing the random flow of reality makes possible the
process
of communicating those meanings to others.

are closely related.

The two processes

But the priority goes to the creating

of meaningful patterns, not to the communicating of them.

We will be paying most of our attention to the first-order
Process of creating the mental patterns that structure
experience.

We will pay some attention

to the second-

order process of communicating those meanings as well, but

not as much.
And really the two processes are so similar that if

we discuss one we can understand both.
the same two fundamental problems.

They both involve

First, there is the

problem of the integration, disintegration, and reintergration of meaning patterns.

In both the creation and the commun-

ication of meanings there is at first the coalescence of patterns in the mind, then the partial or complete failure of
the pattern to hold its own against new data of experience,

and finally the search for a new pattern that will be more

adequate than the first.

The second problem concerns how

those patterns emerge in the first place, as the products of

rational or of nonrational or of irrational mental processes

—

or in a different but equivalent vocabulary, as the pro-

ducts of conscious, preconscious
cesses.

,

or unconscious mental pro-

We will discuss the processes of creating and com-

municating

nieanings in terms

of these two problems.

After that.

:
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we will analyze more broadly how the human being structures his experience, biologically and mentally.
The Creating of Meanings
Let us say. a man falls in love with a woman.

has not been in love before

He

He has gone along as a

.

fairly happy bachelor who had arranged the details of his
life pleasantly enough to suit himself.

his over-all experience viably.

He had structured

But now because he has

fallen in love his normal schedule has become suddenly

inconvenient, his usual diet uninteresting, many of his
habits boring or distasteful, his job burdensome, his

favorite cat a nuisance, etc.

The carefully structured

patterns of his bachelorhood, which had helped him make
sense of his life for a while, have just fallen apart.
He has the choice now either of trying to hold them

together against the intruding female, or of rebuilding
the patterns of his life around her and with her.

The pattern repeats itself wherever there is a

question of creating meanings.
perience mentally.

One structures his ex-

The mind moves from raw experience

into patterned meaning

Experience

>

Structure

The mental structure becomes so fajiiliar and works so

well that one forgets it is

a

creation of the mind, and
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takes it for reality.

self-validating.

It begins to feel self-evident and

The reason for this is that the mental

structure is now increasingly controlling and limiting
the
range of experiences one feels open to.

The mental structure

patterns experience and in so doing tends to exclude from it

whatever might not fit the pattern.

If experience underlies

and leads to the structure, the structure also underlies and

leads to future experience;

Experience

Structure

<

But then the new thing happens.
felt,

Something new is

some unaccustomed thing surfaces and makes itself hard

^ot to see.

The old pattern does not help one in practice;

it leads to a defeat or a disappointment.

The old and com-

fortable pattern of meaning becomes suspect.

It is no longer

so inevitable nor so authoritative as it was.

things it has failed to take into account.

There are

Reality talks

back to the mind's neat meanings, and tries to force them to

broaden themselves:

New Experience

>

.»i

r ^-i-n

The mind will not often feel comfortable with such
a situation,

and may resist giving up its habitual ways of

handling experience.

It may even prefer to set up a mental

para-world in competition to the non-mental world of experience.
What was its interpretation of reality now becomes its inter-

pretation against reality:
LIaw-Jg^ \^e V i eirr
-

<

Old Structure
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But sooner or later the old structures
of the mind
will have to give up their hold.
if only out of sheer exhaustion, they will have to give reality some
kind of per-

mission to be more supple and various, more
extensive, more
manifold than they ever have been themselves.
At such
a

moment we face a new dimension of life with no
adequate
structure to make sense of it, yet we are in search
of such
a new structure:

New Experience

>

?? New Structure ??

When it is found the cycle of course will start again.
Always there are the conflicting claims of the world and
of
the mind, of too much chaotic variety and of too much
reduc-

tive order, of too much fluidity and of too much rigidity.

To acknowledge the simultaneous validity of these conflicting
claims, there is the on-going process of the integration,

disintegration, and reintegration of meanings.

But what falls

apart and what pulls back together is not reality itself,

only our metaphors of it.
The two-way arrows we are using here are symbols, then,
that stand for opposing tendencies of the mind and that imply
a

tension of values.

arrow

(

>)

What we might call the reality-based

stands for the mind's moving from multiform im-

pressions toward reductive order.
but not for its own sake.

It

is.

Here the ordering is important,

important only to the extent

that it is based on and answerable to the empirical.

It is not

15
a floating,

autonomous order.

It is a structure created

by the mind for the purpose of dealing with
experience,

hence is constantly to be revised as that experience
changes.
It is tentative order, willing to yield to the
pressure of

reality, willing to bow out in favor of a new order,
itself
also tentative, that might make better sense out of the

immensities and varieties of things.

In other words, the

reality-based arrow implies the mind's awareness that all
its interpretations and structurings of things are metaphors
of reality.

It implies, too, how fragile is the world of

the mind's meanings.

The other arrow

(<

)

we might call order-based.

It represents the mind's tendency to resist experience in

favor of clinging to meaning systems that become more and

more habitual.

Here the mental structures determine what

shall be experienced, rather than vice versa.

This is the

principle that makes possible mental stability in a universe
of flux.

Because of it the mind rejects

—

or perhaps more

often simply fails to notice -- any discrepancies between
its systems and the world "out there."

remembrance of metaphor.
rectly.
a

Here there is no

Mind and reality are equated di-

Here everything has

a name,

known function, a firm outline.

a

place on a value grid,

This is the domain of

essences, the place of the Platonic te’mptation, and of the

Platonic sin.
Txie

For here reality does not inform the mind.

mind informs reality, and becomes its own emperor and
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its own empire, needing an ever more rigidly
guarded border

against the hostile intrusions of the outer darkness.

One

thinks of a Kurt Vonnegut character who, confronted
with
Death, commanded it to vanish.

His authority for doing so:

His sovereign Imagination would not suffer Death's
presence.

But these two principles are in tension because they

belong to the same system.
of the other.

Neither ever exists fully free

To be purely "reality-based" would be a har-

rowing madness of endless disconnections.

To be purely

"order-based" would be a no less real madness of moribund
csi'taintie s

.

The mind seems unable to yield altogether to

either extreme.
try.

But that is not to say it is unwilling to

The positions taken on large public questions by

politicians, educators, religious leaders, and ordinary

citizens are frequently much less based on the merits of
tnose positions as such than on which of the two tendencies
of the mind they favor.

Persons more "reality-based" will

tend to favor flexibility in political, educational, and

religious systems -- perhaps even to the point of ruinous
chaos.

Persons more "order-based" will tend to favor maxi-

mum security in these same things.

The real tension^ between

"liberals" and "conservatives," or between the far more extreme "anarchists" and "fascists," is not basically an argu-

ment about the world.

It is an argument about the mind.

It may seem as though there were an irreducible oppo-

sition between the two mental tendencies represented by the

17

two arrows.

But there is also, or there can be, a harmony

between them

—

and not just a gentlemanly truce, either,

but a genuine cooperation.

There is another kind of men-

tality than a drastically flexible one or a drastically
rigid one.

Dr.

Lawrehce

S.

Kubie

,

M.D.

,

introduces some

helpful distinctions on this point:
There is the realistic form of symbolic
thinking in which we are clearly aware of the
relationship of the symbols of language to
that which we intend to represent. Here the
function of the symbol is to communicate the
hard core, the bare bones of thought and purpose.
This is conscious symbolic function.
At the other end of our spectrum is the
symbolic process in which the relationship
between the symbol and what it represents has
been either distorted or completely ruptured
by an active process of dissociation in time
and place betv/een affect and its occasion,
which results in that dissociation between
symbol and its root, which leads to what is
called "repression." As a consequence, the
symbol here is a disguised and disguising
representative of unconscious levels of psychological processes.
In this area the
function of the symbolic process is not to
communicate but to hide, not deliberately but
automatically, and not only from others but
even more urgently from ourselves. This is the
unconscious symbolic process as it occurs in
dreaming and in psychological illness.
There is however another type of mentation
whose relationship to its roots is figurative
and allegorical.
The function of this intermediate form of mentation is to express at
least by implication the nuances of thought
and feeling, those collateral and emotional
references which cluster around the central
core of meaning.
Here every coded signal has
many overlapping meanings; and every item of
data from the world of experience has many
coded representatives. This is the form of

.

^

.

18

coded language which is essential for all
creative thinking whether in art or science
Therefore we will have much more to say about
It below.
In technical jargon, this second
type of symbolic process is called preconscious
,

.

The contribution of preconscious processes
to creativity depends upon their freedom in
gathering, assembling, comparing, and reshufof ideas.
Indeed the special creative
virtue of this continuous play of preconscious
processes, concurrently with conscious and
unconscious processes, lies in the fact that
it is the preconscious type of symbolic function
which frees our psychic apparatus (and more
specifically our symbolic processes) from
rigidity .... flexibility of symbolic imagery is
essential if the symbolic process is to have
that creative potential which is our supreme
human trait.
I will repeat that this creative
flexibility is made possible predominantly if
not exclusively by the free, continuous, and
concurrent action of preconscious processes.^
VJhat we are

calling the order-based type of mind Kubie

calls conscious and rational.

What we are calling reality-

based (in the sense of empirical, random, unstructured) is
similar to, if not quite identical
scious and irrational.

v/ith,

what he calls uncon-

The rational and conscious mind deals

in univocal meanings, the unconscious and irrational one in

equivocal meanings.

Kubie

's

main interest^ however is in what

he calls the preconscious mind, which is non-rational without

being either univocal or equivocal.

It deals in meanings that

For the sake of making clear the relationship

work by analogy.

^Lawrence S. Kubie, M.D., Neurotic Distortion of the
Creative Process (N.Y.
The Noonday Press, 1970), p. 30.
:

2lbid

•

r

p

.

37
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to each other of the several technical words we are
using

here, we might schematize the tripartite mind thus:

LEVEL
OF
MIND

DESCRIPTIVE
DEFINITION

RELATION
TO
LOGIC

BASE

TYPE
OF
MEANING

CONSCIOUS

rigid
like a solid

rational

autonomous
order

UNCONSCIOUS

amorphous
like a gas

irrational

unassimilated equivocal
reality

PRECONSCIOUS

supple
like a liquid

nonrational

association

univocal

analogous

From the unconscious comes the strange, dark pressure
on us of all those things

v;e

have not known how to assimilate

from our interactions with reality, but which nevertheless
are there and seek some kind of recognition.

From the con-

scious mind comes the clarity and logic of realities that have
been, or seem to have been, assimilated fully once and for all.

But from the preconscious comes reality in process of being
assimilated, no longer unconscious, not yet fixed in too firm
a

conscious category, reality being arranged and rearranged

in different combinations by the mind that sees now one, now

another similarity among its elements.
soft outline,

a

changing face, and

a

It is reality with a

playful disposition.

20

The scheme E

<

>

M where "E" stands for Experience
,

and "M" for Metaphor, stands for the process of creating
mean-

ings out of the unstructured materials of experience.

The

process is a double one, symbolized here by the double arrow.
It involves a tension, between the distinct claims
of reality

and of mind, reality claiming priority over mind and the
right
to threaten any system the mind might produce to explain
it,

the mind meanwhile claiming the right not to suffer reality's

confusion and the right to make order to replace it.

Depend-

ing on how the tension balances, we wind up with one or the

other of the three mental levels described by Kubie.

If the

randomness and dissociation of raw, felt, but unassimilated

reality dominates we have the situation of the unconscious

mind in which there are strong feelings but no clear meanings.
We can symbolize the imbalance this way:

>

m

And if the hard precision of defined ideas and strictly logical

connections drives out awareness of the rich variety of things,
we have the situation of the fully conscious mind in which there
is no longer room for the intrusions of the real world:

e

<

But v;hen there is a vigorous tension between the two poles, as
i

’iG

simple scheme E

<

>

M implies there ought to be, and the

,

,

21

mind loves reality's freedom as much as it
loves its own
efforts to give a form to that freedom, the
situation is
the happy marriage of opposites in which one
contributes

what the other lacks.

Here, meaning comes in the making

of metaphors.

True education results in the process symbolized by
the double arrow.

It lacks neither the experience nor the

structure, the feeling nor the form, the immense freedom nor
the immense discipline.

It is, then, less a matter of teach-

ing the permanent meanings of things than of teaching people

how to create meanings for themselves.

In the psychological

lives of individuals and in the cultural lives of entire

societies there is the constant organizing and reorganizing
of experience into meanings.

On both levels life is the

story of changing metaphors.

And if education is to deal with

life it will have to deal with the processes by which meta-

pnoric meanings are created and are changed.

Education, then:

a)

must help people to trust their own experience (E)
to know v;hat that experience is, to be unfearful
If it is broader and subtler than their ideas or
contradicts some of their beliefs, to understand
that that experience of theirs is the prima materia
of their lives, the source, the empirical base
and ultimately the judge of all their values, ideas,
behaviors, and relationships;

b)

must help them to explore the various ways of
structuring that experience (M)
to do comfortably
without dogmatic, fixed meanings; to enjoy the
adventure of finding new metaphors or reconfirming
old ones; to cherish truths that can change;
;

22

and must teach them how to be the agents in
their own lives of that double process (<
by which meanings are created.

c)

>)

The Communication of Meanings
The first mental process is to create meanings.

happens within each individual mind.

This

The process ends in the

production of metaphors that make some kind of sense out of
experience.

The second mental process is to share such mean-

ings once they have been created.

This second process, com-

munication, takes place when two parties, with different metaphors (M^ and M
(E^ and E

2

)

2

)

to structure their differing experiences

of reality, reveal those metaphors to each other.

The interaction on each other of those two sets of structured

meanings is the process of communication:

E,

"1"

ess.
2

Party

M,

and "2" symbolize the parties involved in the proc1

could be either an individual or a group.

could be either an individual or a group as well.

Party

And, what

is probably the most intriguing combination for our psychological

age,

the two parties may not even be separate beings at all.

They could be distinct "levels" of the same personality.
In the process of communication there is always consid-

erable tension, no matter who the parties are.

In fact, there

are two distinct tensions, both symbolized in our diagram by

.
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the vertical arrows.

The first may be considered a "political"

tension between the parties involved.
the symbols they use.

The second concerns

The first may be considered as a ques-

tion of one party's establishing his power vis-a-vis the
other.
The second is the question of what effect one party's
metaphors
has on his understanding of the other party's metaphors.

First, the process of communication is a tension between

two power centers.

crypto-battle.

It is a test of wills, and can even be a

R.D. Laing relates an admittedly extreme example

An argument occured between two patients in the
course of a session in an analytic group. Suddenly, one of the protagonists broke off the argument to say, 'I can't go on. You are arguing in
order to have the pleasure of triumphing over me.
At best you win an argument. At v/orst you lose
an argument.
^ am arguing in order to "preserve
my existence
.

But, as Laing points out, what is exaggerated here is some-

thing everyone experiences in less dramatic ways.

"A firm

sense of one's own autonomous identity is required in order

that one may be related as one human being to another.

Other-

wise, any and every relationship threatens the individual with
loss of identity"

(p.

44)

In much that passes for communi-

cation in the world, the true issue is not meaning, but power.
This is perhaps easier to recognize in its more obnoxious forms uhan in its beneficial ones.

and-so "because your father said to."

The son is to do thusThe daughter is expected

^R. D. Laing, The Divided Self (Harmondsworth, England:
Penguin Books, Ltd., 1971), p. 43.
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to share her mother's viewpoint because
it is her mother's

viewpoint.

The citizen is to value something and disdain

another because such is the American (or English
or Chinese)
way.

People are to believe that the Virgin Mary was
taken

bodily to heaven because, sitting in the proper
chair for
the purpose, the pope said she was.

cation

In this type of communi-

accept or reject what you say to me because of who

I

you are to me.
But "you" are a possible threat to "me" in this case.

You by-pass my own perceptions, and take no account of my

experiences nor of what sense

I

have been able to find in them.

You ask me to trust your authority and to deny any of my own.
In essence, you are asking me to abdicate my position as an
s^^tonomous and self —validating person.

reasons given why
am

I

I

should do this:

to judge anyway,

little,

I

There are always good

Society knows best, who

it's better to believe too much than too

can't go through life with

a

chip on my shoulder, etc.

It is altogether too easy to allow someone to exercize power

Yet that assertion of myself would set up a dynamic and positive tension between two parties who might then be mutually

respectful of each other.

Only where that tension is present

will communication have to do with feelings, ideas, facts,
values, issues, meanings.

much as

a

Otherwise, it resembles nothing so

military encounter,

a

getting and losing of ground.

I
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When this scuffling becomes the substance of the
communication we suffer an eclipse of mind in
ritory.

a

struggle for ter-

But when it is the preliminary to it, we have a

necessary and useful exchange of credentials.
The power conflict goes on, both in its harmful and
its beneficial aspects, whenever there is a communication.

When two individuals speak there is inevitably a skirmishing

—

for position

for a position of advantage if the conver-

ss-tion takes place in an implicit or explicit atmosphere of

ihtimidat ion

,

or for a position of equality if the conversation

takes place in an atmosphere of trust and mutual esteem.

The

same kind of power conflict goes on when one (or both) of the

parties is a group or society rather than an individual.
a

For

group has a quasi-personality which can be described by

the same formula as the personality of an individual:

E

<

>

The members of the group have a shared experience "base" and

shared ways of structuring and expressing that common experiOtherwise, they are not a coherent group.

ence.

They are

only an accidental combination.
.

It must be noticed, however, that a group personality

is much more constricted than an individual one.

The experi-

ences shared by the members of the group are not all of the

experiences they have individually.

The members of the group

have similar but far from identical genetic inheritance, organisms,

and environments, and make similar but not identical

responses.

Groups are based on the similarities and fall apart

M.
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over the differences.

minimum personality,

In this sense, then, a group has a
a

lowest-common-denominator personality,

based on a limited portion of its members'
total experiential base, and structured and expressed through
a limited

portion of the total metaphors actually used
by them as
individuals.

Strangely, it is the attenuated personality

of a group that frequently overwhelms the far
fuller per-

sonality of an individual, with the effect of making
him

increasingly distrust in himself whatever impulses, manners,
fantasies, or beliefs of his are not the common property of
the whole group.

Still, the struggle for power in communication is

not won by sheer numbers or weight.

Societies produce their

own critics as well as their own followers.

Some men assert

their individual authority in the face of the more massive,
but neither more nor less authentic, authority of the group.
The political tension between individual and group makes for

tyrannies if the group wins all the power, for anarchies if
the individuals win all the power, and for a creative social

tension if they both win in the contest for power.
The same kind of shifting for position that happens

among individuals and groups takes place also within an individual.

We talk to ourselves more than we realize, and

that talking is in part a contest for primacy among the forces

within us.

We know that at their best our motives are mixed,

our emotions ambivalent, our attitudes contradictory, our
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behavior inconsistent, our personalities
heterogeneous,
the messages we send ambiguous

uinely so nevertheless.

—

not totally so, but gen-

If these inner divisions are acute

enough we cease to be functional and need therapy.

But

even at that, the ambiguities within a personality
are

fundamentally valuable, for they show

a

person that there

is more to himself than he has officially
acknowledged,

that there are other possibilities within himself to
be
explored.

There is a kind of "second self" that "talks"

to the "first self."
In the case of intra-personal communication, it is
1-^beral and accurate to speak of distinct levels of experi-

ence.

itself.

Nobody's experience is totally in agreement with
For example, one's experience of sexuality may be

both exhilarating and harrowing.

Or, physically one can

be both hungry and nauseated at the same time.

one

Or,

can simultaneously feel proud of himself and have doubts

about himself.

On this pre-symbolic level of direct, unin-

terpreted, still unexpressed experience, there is no law

against a thing being both true and false at the same time.
Indeed, one's experience is made up of just such contraries,

and that is why it can be represented by

and

in our

basic diagram.
Further, each distinguishable aspect of one's exper-

ience seeks out its own proper vehical of expression

(M)

.

One's

positive feelings toward, say, sex will express themselves in
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one set of fantasies, behaviors,
values, roles, dreams, etc.
One's negative or confused feelings
toward it will show up
in a very distinct set.
in other words, one's divergent
experience is expressed in divergent metaphors.
The metaphors which express and clarify experience
also express and
clarify the ambivalences within that
experience.
It is,

in fact, the presence of these conflicting
clusters of

metaphors in the same person that makes it
possible for that
person to "get at" unresolved
and otherwise potentially

—

annihilating

—

tensions of his life.

The doubleness of personality is pathological only
If one dimension of experience is repressed
in favor of

another, and its corresponding set of metaphors is
repressed
in favor of the other set.

Here too, the abuse of power will

cause a reaction against power.

The abused "half" will have

its revenge, the oppressor "half" v;ill have its comeuppance.

But doubleness in personality

—

ambiguities of experience,

inconsistency of expressive metaphor
automatically pathological.

—

is far from being

It is what keeps one's person-

ality an open system, free of self-strangling rigidities.
One is always more than he appears to his own official self
to be.

Besides those dimensions of his own experience which

he has acknowledged and his society sanctioned, there are

other dimensions only dimly recognized.

But those other dimen-

sions of experience are already making themselves known, through

unguarded thoughts, in dreams, in "Freudian slips," through the

.

spontaneous uses of leisure moments, through one's
unexpected
empathy with this or that character in a film.
The other, hidden, unofficial self, which is sometimes
also the forbidden self, is constantly talking to the
official one, reminding it of doors it has too quickly closed.
It asks that its authority and power be recognized in
the

conversation that goes on within the apparent unity of the
self

The first kind of tension symbolized by the vertical
arrow, then, is the result of each of the parties' trying to

set up a power base from which to communicate.

The second

hind of tension is that between the symbols or metaphors
used by the two parties to convey their meanings to each
other.

The difficulty with the metaphors is frequently

aggravated because people so easily forget that they com-

municate with each other, not at all directly on the level
of experience, but indirectly, on the level of symbolism.

We speak of heart-to-heart talks, of meetings of minds, of

seeing through each other, of feeling what the other fellow
feels.
be,

But all such statements, no matter how common they may

are inadequate to define what communication is all about.

The arrow symbolic of communication should not be seen as

connecting people on the level of experience:
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but on the level of structured meanings, symbols,
metaphors:

M
nI'

M

2

The result of communication is that two people contact
each
other.

But the process of communication is that two sets of

contact each other. "I" set up my symbols, "you"
set up yours;

I

teinns of yours;

extent,

I

read yours in terms of mine, and you mine in

we then each feel that, to a greater or lesser

know what you mean," and that there has been

a

reasonably successful communication.
There is

a

key assumption being made here, without

which no communication is possible.

It is the assumption

that your symbols relate to my experience basically in the
same way that

^

symbols relate to it.

The assumption is

not always true, of course, but it is true often enough that

trying to communicate is not
prise.

a

hopelessly foredoomed enter-'

Thus, if "you" are crying, "I" assume that one of the

things that would make me cry is now making you cry.

only sad things make me cry,
is possible,

I

Since

assume you must -now be sad.

It

however, that you also cry when you are very happy

or confused or pressured

—

that in other v/ords, your tears are

a more ambiguous symbol than mine would be,

unwitting misinterpretation.
though in fact wrong, has

a

right because it is based on

and more open to

But even so, my interpretation,

high degree of probability of being
v;hat

tears usually mean.

And it

.
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is this high probability, based on the
assumption that your

experience and mine are parallel and that the symbols
through
which we express ourselves are cognate, that makes
it possible
for us to contact each other at all.

But there is a very important implication here.
ing communication on this assumption means that, when

your metaphors,

head as

I

I

read

I

do not so much contact the meanings in your

contact the meanings in my own.

jure up my meanings, and

I

Your symbols con-

assume those are the same as yours.

In all communication there is radical sollipsism.
a

Bas-

It is less

matter of my entering your mind than of my equating mine

with yours.
^

It is not so much that

but that

I

only hear what

I

only hear what

I

can hear.

I

want to

If l use my

inner experience as a block to perceiving yours, as in fact
a

substitute for yours,

I

am guilty of pure projection; if,

more carefully and more sensitively,

I

for trying to feel what yours might be,

but empathizing.

use them as a basis
I

am not projecting

The first is communication easy and false.

The second is communication more difficult and more true.
•

The tensions between the symbols of communication can

be illustrated as follov\7s:

A monarchist and an anarchist would have no trouble
comn.unicating about kingship.
They both mean exactly
the same thing by it, they only put a different price
on it
But a divine-right monarchist and a constitutional
monarchist would have considerable difficulties.
One says "king" to the other, meaning "figurehead,"
but inadvertantly conveying "absolute ruler." The
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two men, presented formally to the monarch
on
an occasion of state, will not be kneeling
to
the same thing.
On the cpther hand, if a constitutional
monarchist
king to an American who says "president,"
they will have small difficulty seeing where
their meanings overlap and where they diverge.

The first instance -- the monarchist and the
anarchist
is an example of univocal meaning in communication.

What is

in "your" head is demonstrably identical with what is
in "my"

head, or is so close that we would have to quibble to find
the
f si^snce

.

We can picture the overlap of meanings this way;

The second instance -- the two kinds of monarchists -is an example of equivocal meanings in communication.

We use

the same word but mean almost totally dissimilar things.

The third

—

the monarchist and the democrat

—

use

different words, but in much of what they mean they overlap

Equivocal meanings for the same symbol are obviously
•

the enemies of any kind of communication.

Univocal meanings

33

are often regarded as the ideal toward which
all communi-

cation ought to strive, and this is true

^ we

are talking

either about something that is of its nature
cut-and-dried
and hence incapable of further development, or
about something we have already, fully agreed on.

possibility

—

phoric overlap

It is in the third

communication by analogous concepts, by metathat the excitement of a genuine inter-

course of meanings takes place.

What Kubie says of the symbols within one's mind is
true also of symbols being exchanged between two parties.

They can be rational, univocal, consequently cold, limited,
brittle; or they can be hopelessly divergent, equivocal,

therefore rigid, confusing, devious; or they can be related
by analogy, rich in unexpressed implications, provocative,

open-ended, inviting more talk rather than less.
It is in this last way that art communicates.

It

opens up further meanings by eliciting the personal and

subjective response of the beholder.

means what

A work of art not only

means, it also means what the viewer adds to it

by metaphoric connection.

It not only tolerates but welcomes

this contribution to the fullness of associations that cluster

around it.
We have not yet in schools tried to do anything more
than to get people to quit making equivocal statements and to

start making univocal ones.
s-vills of

For all that we talk about the

communication we have done little to develop the
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richest of those skills, the exploring of analogies.

For

in the process of communication there is, more
often than

not, a tension between what one party means and
what the

other means:

a

similarity that is not identity, a dissim-

ilarity that is not disjunction.

Every word has a larger

cargo than its dictionary definition.

Everything a person

says has unstated implications in his mind and conjures up

®till further associations in the mind of his listener.

The fun of talking is getting at those plus-meanings, those

feelings and ideas that come riding piggy-back on other

feelings and ideas.

Those plus— meanings are the contribution

made by personal, subjective imagination to the otherwise

dreary prospect of always knowing just exactly, to the last

one-hundredth of

a

boring inch, what the other fellow means.

The skeleton of conversation is univocal symbols.

But the

muscle and blood of it is in the free play of metaphor.
The Elements of Human Experience
The basic work of the mind is to create meaningful

structures out of the otherwise random flow of things.

It

does this work by making connections, comparisons, metaphors.
The second work of the mind is to share with others
the meaningful structures that have been created.

The work

of communication, too, is done by making connections, compar-

isons, metaphors.
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Since metaphor exists to structure and communicate

experience, the further study of what constitutes experience leads naturally to a deeper understanding of the
role
of metaphor.

For the remainder of this chapter we will

examine the elements of human experience.

When anyone speaks of some man's experience, the
reference usually is to the People, the Places, and the
Things of that man's life.

V7e

generally take experience to

be constructed of concrete nouns:

definable masses, particulars.

substances, solid and

Such a notion may do well

enough for the purposes of ordinary conversation, but it
will not hold up under reflection.

For it is evident that

not all the People, Places, or Things that have in some way

been part of one's life are also part of what he would con-

sider his experience

.

Most, in fact, float in, through,

and out, leaving perhaps a tiny trace on the memory, but not

entering at all into the fabric of associations and meanings
that constitute one's total experience.

We simply do not

register everything that goes on around us, even if it is
going on in full view.

We exclude most of

most of the sounds that fill the air.

it,

as we exclude

It is more than a matter

of merely not adverting to something, it is a matter of not

engaging with it at all.
on,

There is some sort of selection going

and it is this process of selection that determines what

will be one's experience and v;hat

v/ill

not.

Indeed, experience

is not the list of nouns that answer the question What,

it is
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the process that answers the question How.

Experience is

an adverb, the qualifier of a process, the modifier of an

interaction, the determiner of a relationship.
This can be better understood if we break the global

concept "experience" down into smaller parts.

For it is

clear that there are many selections going on and many transformations.

In the simple act of vision, for example, there

are at least these:

First, my eye itself as a physical organ

selects one small band out of all the range of radiant energy
to respond to, and in so doing defines and also radically

limits what

I

can respond to visually in the world.

Next,

once my organism has decided to perceive some things in terms
of light, my eye will fall on certain things in the scene

before it and not on others.

Either

I

will deliberately

exclude anything that is irrelevant to my conscious purposes
at the moment, or unconsciously and for reasons secret even
to myself

them.

I

will favor some things over others and fix on

Further, there is a whole complex of emotional responses

that continues processing and transforming the thing

I

am look-

ing at as it goes its way through my experiencing system.

The

sight of the thing may be pleasurable or painful, attractive
or repulsive, etc.

It is, then, interpreted as being emotion-

ally acceptable or not.

Still further, the object

I

am look-

ing at may in my mind stand for thing's in my past, or for
v/ishes and hopes of mine I have formed for the future, or for

my fears, so that the object begins to have about it that aura

.
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of larger meaning that surrounds
literary symbols.

Thus,

my interaction with the object actually
is many experiences
of It at once, all interlocking,
hierarchically ordered
among themselves, which blend so perfectly
together that
they give me the helpful illusion of
a simple and direct and
literal and objective contact with some
little piece of the
world "out there."
Thus, experience is the sum, to date, of
the inter-

actions of an organism with its environment.
For us human beings, experience is of two
orders si-

multaneously;

biological and mental.

There is our biological

interaction with reality, determined by the kind of organism
we are.
There is also our mental interaction with
reality.

And there is, finally, the interaction within us of the
biothe mental.

When

v^e

speak of the metaphoric

structuring of experience, then, we are speaking of

a

contin-

uum of things:

E

(biological

<

<•

>

mental)'

<

•>

M

>

M

Biology is concerned in the first place with one's
physical organism

ment

(En)

It is also concerned with the environ-

(0)

in which that organism functions.

with the genetic endowment
organism to exist at all.
G

(G)

And it is concerned

which makes it possible for that

From the genes comes the organism:
>

0

:

.:

:
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The environment determines the success or failure
of the

genetically constituted organism:
0

<

En

So that, putting the two together:
G

0

>

<

En

But we know also that the organism, by its health and

viability, favors some of the mutations of the genes and, by
its lack of health and its dysfunctions, suppresses others:
G

<

O

We know too that an organism does not passively accept the
elements around it, but actively arranges them to make a

workable environment for itself
0

>

En

So that
G

<

o

>

En

>

En

And to put it all together thus far
G

<

>

0

<

—

This is the triad of evolutionary forces.

The constant

interaction among these three factors constitutes the first,
the biological structuring of the otherwise random flow of

reality
For man, however, the process does not end there.

By

whatever epigenesis from the biological level it may have come
to be, the symbol-making mind is the fourth element in the

continuum of experience.
human response

(R)

Making symbols is the specifically

to the flow of being.

It is the fourth

_
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determiner of our interactions with reality,
and is itself
in interaction with the elements of
our biological
nature.

Finally, it is the source of those metaphoric
structures
by which we understand anything:
E

>

o

<

>

En)

<

->

^

<

>

M

We will look now more closely at the biological
and

mental constituants of experience.

For these are the things

that the mind will organize into patterns meaningful
to itself through the making of comparisons, connections,
metaphors
I

•

The Organism:

Nature's Epistemology

The body is given like a fate.

One v/ill be able to

do what his body can do, and v;here it fails him he fails.
is the major resource,

It is,

so to speak,

It

and the major limitation, of one's life

a gift of the genes and a gift of the

environment which supports it

—

a

more or less generous gift,

depending on the viability of the genetic structure and the
appropriateness of the supporting environment.

This compli-

cated symbiotic arrangement is explained simply by the eminent

geneticist Theodosius Dobzhansky:
A human egg cell weighs roughly one twentymillionth of an ounce; a spermatozoon weighs
much less; an adult person weighs, let us say,
160 pounds, or some fifty billion times more
than an egg cell. The material for this grov/th
comes evidently from the environment.
In a
broad sense, this is the food the organism consumes and transforms into constituents of the

^
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body.
A human body transforms its
food in
ways somewhat different from a
dog's or a
frog s or a fly's body.
The transformations
occur according to the instructions
emanating from the genes, by way of the
DNA-RNAribosomes-proteins chain of command. The
outcome of the transformation depends,
however, not only on the genes, but also
on
the materials to be transformed, that
is,
on the kind of food the organism consumes
and on the conditions under which it
develops.
The phenotype is, then, a result of inter-*
actions betv/een the genotype and the sequence
of the environments in which the individual
lives
.

The complex interaction described here is
symbolized by our
schema:
G
>
0 <
En.
As it is given by the genes and as it is nourished

and developed by its environment, the actual physical
body
is the basis of all of one's experience.

It not only estab-

lishes the limit of possible experience and knowledge, it
is_

that limit.

Philosophers have looked, from Plato to Kant

and from Kant to the psychoanalysts, for the apriori struc-

tures of human knowledge
the mind.

the body.

of the philosophers,

—

him to.

But they have looked for them in

Nature has laid down an apriori more obvious and

more stern:

with

.

"know"

---

Nature's epistemology, unlike that

is biology itself.

One will interact

his environment in the way his body allows

The more complex and supple his organism is, and the

more tools it contains in the form of levers, cutters, grasper

^Theodosius Dobzhansky, He redity and the Nature of
Man (N.Y.;
The New American Library, 1966), p. 58.

^
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digesters, sensors, motors, etc., the more
he will be able
to relate to
"know"
in his surrounding physical world.
Since the body is the basis of all knowledge,

—

—

it

is not surprising that myths,

the first articulated forms

that human knowledge took, made the world
seem to be a great
human body, built in basically the same way
as we are built

ourselves.
his world

Change a man's body and you have literally
changed

.

The body as epistemological limit is directly
exper-

ienced by each individual.

But the ways that that body has

come to be as it now is are more hidden, and are
not directly

experienced by individuals.

The body is the product of eons

of evolution, the result of having faced and solved endless

series of problems that no one now remembers.
3-i^cane

The body's

wisdom has been in the making for billions of years,

from the first broth, and from the slime beneath the broth.
There are two forces that have shaped and reshaped it, changed
and changed again the structure of its organs and therefore
the shape of its knowledge of reality.

genes and the environment:
II

.

The Genes:

G

>

0

Those forces are the
<

En,

Nature's "Ethics"

The body is both a stable legacy and a tenuous experiment.

Looked at one way it seems given once and for all.

It

^We will discuss more fully in Chapter III the function

of myth.

.

42

IS passed on to the next generation most
carefully and con-

servatively.

Biological heredity does not try experiments

much beyond the sort of fooling it does, say, with
eye and
hair color among Caucasians.

And even such small experi-

ments turn out to be strictly obedient to Mendel's laws.
The genes

bility.

(G

>

0)

are the principle of biological sta-

The most evident talent of living matter is that

it can reproduce itself with a precision bordering on the

uncanny
But the genes are doing something more than guaran-

teeing that things will always remain the same.

They are

also guaranteeing that things will not remain the same;
How many genes man has, is not knov/n; very
imprecise estimates range from 10,000 per sex
cell upward.
If all genes undergo mutation
with average frequencies* the combined incidence of all mutations would be quite substantial.
If, let us suppose, man has at least
genes
20,000
(10,000 from his mother and an
equal number from his father)
the chances
become 0.00004 X 20,000, or 0.8.
It would seem
then that 80 per cent of the individuals born
contain in their genetic endowments a mutant
gene they have not inherited from their parents.
This may be an overestimate, because two
or more new mutants may by coincidence be in
the same person; on the other hand, 10,000
genes per sex cell is probably an underestimate.
Even taking the low estimate of 10,000
genes and 1:100,000 as the mutation rate
per gene, the calculation gives about 20 per
cent, or almost one in five individuals born,
as the number of carriers of newly arisen
It is clear, then, that mutation
mutant genes.
is not at all a rare phenomenon.^
,

,

*

(of

about 4:100,000)
^Dobzhansky, ibid

.

,

p.

123.
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The genes are the principle of biological
creativity as
well as of biological stability. They seem
at one and
the same time to be totally mechanistic and
totally random.

Insofar as they stabilize living matter they are
the most
awesome example in all nature of pure determinism.
But

— for no known
external — they are

insofar as they suddenly, abruptly change

internal reason and for no reason

nature

s

most astounding instance of pure indeterminism.

The mutations occur in a splendid disregard of whether

they may be of any practical use whatsoever
G

>

.

The formula

0 thus suggests the organism's subjection to both

genetic determinism and genetic caprice.
But the process does not end there.

also reacts to genetic mutation:
it reacts against it.

G

<

0.

The organism

Frequently

The mutation may distort or weaken

the organism, and be no progress at all.

If left to nature,

without the interventions of medicine or surgery, an organism thus distorted or weakened will tend to use either or

both of two devices to try to cancel out the mutant gene.
Either the organism will die before reaching maturity, or it
will reach maturity but be sterile.

If, on the other hand,

the organism "accepts" the mutation as not being intrinsically

harmful, it will pass it on as it does all the rest of its

genetic endowment:

according to Mendel's laws.

Darlington describes the process:

C.

D.
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Living organisms have made the discoverv
that lower-level irregularities in mutation
and recombination, if not suppressed or buffered, can be exploited.
In order to exploit
them the organism can actually use them to
boost one another. By a regulated irregularity in the recombination of mutations in the
sexual alternation of diploid and halved
phases of life, they are, as it were, skillfully exposed to the action of selection in
changing or optional environments generation
after generation.
Selection acts deterministically so that the environment can appear
to change the organism and change its heredity in the course of evolution.
It can
appear (until we have microscopes and experiments to guide us) to act directly.
The
intercalated uncertainty in the living systems is the means of establishing a deterministic relationship between the succession
of living systems and the environment.
This
intercalation of uncertainty has become the
key mechanism of evolution.
It is perhaps
the fundamental discovery of life.
''

In the double process, G

<

>

o,

there is a sort of

tension of opposite values, almost a kind of dual ethic.

Be-

sides contributing to the structure of experience the actual

physical organism, the double process also contributes to it
the feel of paradox, a preference for dualisms, a taste for

the possibilities latent in a contradiction, a desire for

vital tensions rather than sterile neutralities.

The life

process on the level of genes and organism is a dialectical
one, and it is so on every other level of life as well.

the one hand it shows up as a stabilizing force;

^C.

D.

Darlington, Genetics and Man (N.Y.:

Books, 1969), p. 351.

On

the genes

Schoken
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duplicating themselves accurately,
the organism resisting
mutations. On the other hand it
shows up as a creative
force:
the genes mutating, the organism
accepting
and

perpetuating some of the mutations.
process symbolized in the formula G

it is as though the
<

>

o were the

first approximation of what, in conscious
life, will be
an ethic:
Change AND Stay the Same.
It is by being both
mechanistically determined and purely random
that biological life has come to be and has made its
slow climb to the
level we know.
We can recognize in the dialectics of biology
the
beginning of the dialectics of the mind and of
all the

products of the mind.

Here too the conflicting values of

permanence and change have determined progress.

Only, on

the level of mind the conflict does not concern the
condition
of physical forms, but of symbolic forms.

The evolution is

not the evolution of organs and bodies but of languages,

beliefs, and cultures.
for cultural

Biology suggests

(and therefore educational)

a

dialectical ethic

projects, a value

system that profitably contradicts itself by wanting both
firmness and fluidity for its symbolic forms.

We have refer-

red already to the paradoxical need both to structure and to

change structure, and we will look again at this phenomenon
below.

For

nov/

it is enough to point out the adumbration of

that dual process on the most basic and universal level of
life itself.

It is one of the deepest elements of experience.
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But G

>

0 and G

o do not describe all

<

the mechanisms which provide the first
structuring of

experience for man.
vironment;
Ill

.

0

<

There is also the impact of the enEn.

The Environment;

Nature's Politics

...beyond conception, v/hatever we observe
or measure of the organism is a phenotype,
and this by definition is not "fixed." The
phenotype is a result of the organism's
internal genetic mechanisms established at
conception and all the physical and social
influences that impinge on the organism
throughout the course of its development.^

Arthur Jensen here is stating the pattern with which
we started this discussion of experience;

G

>

0

<

En

Until the idea of genetic mutation was invoked to account for
the evolution of biological forms, many people, notably

Lamarck early in the last century, thought evolution took
place by the interaction of the organism and its environment,
0

<

>

En, or more specifically by the influence of the

environment on the organism, 0 <-

En.

This view, now

scientifically discredited, has been the object of delightful
satires;

^Arthur Jensen, "How Much Can We Boost IQ and
Scholastic Achievement?" Harvard Educational Review,
XXXIX, No. 1 (1969), 17.
•

^
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— Tell

me, papa, why are palm trees so tall?
--It's so that the giraffes can eat them, my child, for...
...if palm trees were very small the giraffes would be

very inconvenienced.
then, papa, why do the giraffes have such long necks?
That's so they can eat the palm trees, my child, for...
--Ahl
...if the giraffes had short necks .they would be even more
inconvenienced.

— But

^Darlington, ibid

.

,

p.

54.
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Still, there is a near truth to the
Lamarckian view.
The genes are by no means the sole forces
at work in deter-

mining the biological structures of experience.

Physical

environment plays a powerful role, if not quite the
exclusive role once theorized for it by Lamarck.
if a mutation
of the genes had produced giraffe-length necks and
forelegs
in an environment where there were only low grasses
to eat,

the mutation would have had no survival value.

Indeed,

chances are it would have been fatal.

The environment does

not affect the genes directly

En)

<

(G

.

It affects the

directly, and by that influence indirectly affects

o^qs-riism

the genes

(G

<

0

<

En)

.

The environment therefore becomes the third member
of the triad of the biological structuring of experience,
at least because it has a kind of political power over which

organisms will survive where

(0

<

En)

.

But its signifi-

cance in the shaping of Experience is broader than that.

Besides being the referee of evolution, the environment also
is actually the creature of evolution.

It sets up the limits

within which living beings will have to function or die, but
also the life forms born into it change that environment to

favor their own survival.

The politics works both ways.

The

total environment is in very large part the product of all
the organisms that have lived within it

(0

not just the product of geological forces.

more strikingly clear than

in,

>

En)

.

It is

Nowhere is this

the very air around the earth.
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All of the free oxygen presently in the
air has been released
into It over billions of years by vegetation.
The atmosphere
of the earth is both the cause and the
effect
of life:

O

<

>

G.

No organism, however, has ever had as drastic
an

impact on its own environment as man.

Not content to change

a small corner of it to suit his small needs,
man has,

effect, reconstituted the whole thing.

in

The organisms of

most animals prevent them from seeing the stars, or
from
surviving beyond certain heights or depths, or from having
any interest in other foods than worms, or from caring
about

territory farther than

a

yard away from home.

But man's

organism imposes really very few such limitations, with the
result that he has sometimes been called-

a

"weed species,"

capable of surviving almost anywhere.

And that is not all.

He goes beyond the capacity of

his own remarkable organism to endure, and finds out the ways

first to survey and then to survive in worlds of water and

worlds beyond the air.

The mind of man has created the real

environment of man, and that environment is:
exists

.

everything that

It is not poetic fiction but hard truth that pi

mesons and the Andromeda nebula and even the invisible radio
stars and the least crustacean and the oddest moss are all
of them parts of the effective environment of man.

And in a

sense too man has become the most important part of their

environment.

Between man and the rest of creation there is

a
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political union in the making.

This situation has not

come about because of an immediate chemical
or physical

survival value that the rest of remote creation
may have
for the human species.
It has come about simply because
man has decided it would.

His greatest impact on his

environment has so far not been a physical act at all.
It has been a silent decision of the mind to
consider

all things knov/able.

Only now is man's physical impact

on his vast environment, or its on him, beginning to be
at all comparable to the mental one.

But that is not to imply that the mental restruc-

turing of the environment has remained within the skull as
a pure possibility,

an agenda yet to be acted on.

Besides

reinterpreting the whole of nature as his own proper environment to be understood and manipulated by means of his
own skills, man has created another kind of environment for

himself

(0

>

En)

.

It is an environment not made up of

the physical, chemical, electromagnetic, or atomic things

of nature.

Instead, it is made of symbols created by the

human mind itself over the centuries.

ment is human culture.

This second environ-

Its elements, analogous to the ele-

ments of nature, are the symbolic or metaphoric structures
through which men have articulated for themselves from pre-

historic times their beliefs, values, knowledge, morals,
feelings, behaviors, relationships, etc.

Man has surrounded
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himself so completely by his own
symbols that they constitute the most obvious and pressing
environment, one
more real than "nature," one indeed
of which nature is
only a part, a raw resource, a factor
in the economy.
On this level of experience the
environment is metaphor
and metaphor is the environment.
The environment of human culture is
both the cause
and the effect of the metaphoric structures
individual

people will have in their minds.

If we take "1" to mean

the individual and "2" to mean the culture
or society, we

have the two kinds of metaphor,

and M^.

If we want to

schematize the origins of cultural forms in the minds
of
individual people, we would do it this way:

If we wish to schematize the impact of the metaphoric
forms

of the cultural environment on the images of the individual

mind, we would do it this way:

The process goes in both directions, new cultural
forms being created by the genius of individual people, and
the old cultural forms functioning as the environment in
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which individual people live and develop.

But both ways

we are dealing with metaphors, creations
of the mind.
We
are not dealing with something older
than the mind here
but with something younger, not with
something more absolute but with something less absolute, nor
with something

inevitable and unchanging but with something
alterable,
indeed with something forever in flux.
Some people have been so impressed by the power
of the great metaphors that have played the most
important

parts in cultural history that they attribute to them
an

almost metaphysical status.

They cannot imagine the mind

thinking in any other forms, assert that these forms are
innate in the mind, and therefore deny effectively that
they are metaphors at all.

This way of viewing the matter

is the essence of Platonism and of the more archaic reli-

gious modes of thought that Plato overhauled and ennobled,
but it is by no means restricted to the ancient world.
Indeed, one of its greatest spokesmen did not die until 1961.
He was Carl Jung.
It is instructive to see how Jung explains the ori-

entation of man to woman:
...the whole nature of man presupposes woman,
both physically and spiritually.
His system
is tuned in to woman from the start, just as
it is prepared for a quite definite world where
there is water, light, air, salt, carbohydrates,
etc.
The form of the world into which he is
born is already inborn in him as a virtual

^
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image.
Likewise parents, wife, children,
birth, and death are inborn in him as
virtual
images, as psychic aptitudes.
These a priori
categories have by nature a collective character; they are images of parents, wife,
and
children in general, and are not individual
predestinations. We must therefore think of
these images as lacking in solid content,
hence as unconscious.
They only acquire solidiby
influence, and eventual consciousness in
the encounter with empirical facts, which
touch
the unconscious aptitude and quicken it to life.
They are in a sense the deposits of all our
ancestral experiences, but they are not the
experiences themselves.
So at least it seems
to us, in the present limited state of our
knowledge.
l must confess that I have never
ysb found infallible evidence for the inheritance of memory images, but I do not regard
it as positively precluded that in addition
to these collective deposits which contain
nothing specifically individual, there may
also be inherited memories that are individually determined
,

(

Jung invokes the authority of the archetypes again and
again, but seldom so clearly as in this passage from his auto-

biography:

.

(N.Y.:

...where the existence of an unconscious
psyche is admitted, the contents of projection
can be received into the inborn instinctive
forms which predate consciousness. Their objectivity and autonomy are thereby preserved,
and inflation is avoided.
The archetypes,
which are pre-existent to consciousness and
condition it, appear in the part they actually
play in reality:
as a priori structural forms
of the stuff of consciousness.
They do not in
any sense represent things as they are in themselves, but rather the forms in which things can
be perceived and conceived.
Naturally, it is

G. Jung, Two Essays on Analytical Psychology
Meridian Books, 1956), p.~200’^!

.
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not merely the archetypes that govern
the
particular nature of perceptions. They
account only for the collective component
of a perception.
As an attribute of instinct
they partake of its dynamic nature and
consequently possess a specific energy which
causes or compels definite modes of behavior
or impulses; that is, they may under certain
circumstances have a possessive or obsessive
force (numinosity
,

I

)

And, in one astounding sentence he says:

"Human knowl-

edge consists essentially in the constant adaptation
of the

primordial patterns of ideas that were given us a priori.

Essentially Jung and the people who think like him
are raising to the level of absolute truth this kind of
pattern:

2

And in the process of doing so he makes two fundamental errors:
(1)

he forgets, or denies, that the "archetypes" are themselves

metaphors, hence are in no sense a priori structures of the mind;
and

(2)

he forgets, or denies, that all the forms of culture

are the products of individual minds that have created meanings

for themselves out of the flow of experience, and are valuable

G. Jung, Memories
Dreams
Vintage Books, 1963), p. 347.
,

(N.Y.:

,

and Reflections

G. Jung, The Undiscovered Self (N.Y.:
Mentor Books, 1958), p. 82.
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only to the extent that they help individuals
to make
sense out of their lives.

No doubt quite against his

conscious intentions, Jung has constructed an
argument
for the fascist state or for the absolute church,
in either

case for some force that would stand against the
creativity
of the individual mind.

dangerous innovator.

For in this view such a mind is a

Indeed, Jung asks himself why the

individual conscious mind should exist at all, and says of
his own question;
a

"...I cannot easily answer it.

confession of faith.

I

It is

believe that finally someone had

to know that this wonderful universe of mountains, seas,

suns and moons, milky ways, and fixed stars exists."

However poetic the answer, it fails to attribute to
the mind any active role whatsoever, other than merely to
be conscious.

The world and the archetypes exist before

the mind, and the patterns of being constitute a wisdom

that needs no changing, that needs reinterpretation at most,
but that is as true for modern as for prehistoric man.

Such

an argument makes too much of a metaphor and too little of

the mind.

The environment of man is twofold.

It is nature,

but nature as reconstituted by the intervention of the human

^Jolande Jacobi, ed.
C
Jung
G
Reflections (N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1961),
^

,

.

.

;

Psychological
p.

35.

56

mind.

It is also non-nature, the world of
symbolic forms
known as culture, which is itself the
creation of the

human mind.

The evolutionary triad of G

<

>

o

<

>

En

IS as basic to man's experience as to
any other creature's.

But his experience goes beyond the biology
of it.

The new

element that makes his experience different is
the way he
responds (R) to the world made by that triad of
forces.

His response is, by the creative power of his mind,
to make

symbols of it.
The Human Response;

The Symbolization of Experience

The final dimension of experience concerns the fundamental, generic response the human organism makes to its en-

vironment.

We are referring to that response insofar as it is

human, and are therefore not speaking of survival instincts
or mechanisms of self-defense or knee-jerks.

The human

response to a stimulus does not go only through the reflex
arc.

The flow of Stimulus into Response (S-R) does not, in

other words, go through an empty organism.

There is

a

process

of mediation involved, or more accurately a process of symbolic

transformation.

The fundamental human response to the environ-

ment is to make symbols of it and to deal with it only through
those symbols.

There are actually two kinds of symbols we make, one

concrete and the other abstract.

They do not always sit

v;ell

together, but for all their arguments they need each other.
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The concrete symbols are the visual, auditory,

kinesthetic, images through which we express how our
world
has felt to us.

They are personal and subjective (though

they can become cultural as well, if enough other people

accept them)

They are more grounded in spontaneous affect

.

than in dispassionate observation, and are closely related
to our life-long tendency to imitate what we look at, to

internalize it by a sometimes physical but more often

abbreviated

feeling out" of what it might feel like to us

to be that other thing or person.

These images are accurate

but they are more accurate about the way we feel than about
the thing or person we are looking at.

These images are,

then, more the products of play than of work,

if by play we

mean pure participation in a process for no ulterior purpose
It is frequently assumed that this imagistic mode of recast-

ing our world is the special property of children and that
it is immature,

but it is even more characteristic of the

greatest scientists and artists.
Kubie calls the preconscious mind.

It is the product of what
It may begin in child-

hood, but something is wrong if it ends there.

The way we go about this internalizing of the world
is elegantly simple.

Essentially we imitate it.

We proceed

by feeling out an analogy between something of ourselves and

something of our environment.
tation

—

We can see the process of imi

of felt analogy -- at work in an infant imitating

^
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his parent.

Jean Piaget describes such a process between

his daughter and himself.

When she was one year old,

...she at once pulled her hair when I pulled
mine.
She also touched her head when I did
so, but V7hen I rubbed my forehead she gave
up
(two weeks' later)
J. discovered her forehead.
When I touched the middle of mine, she
first rubbed her eye, then felt above it and
touched her hair, after which she brought her
hand down a little and finally put her finger
on her forehead ... ^
.

.

.

.

.

.

,

In a more sophisticated version we can detect exactly the

same process in a grown man clutching the armrest of his chair

during a terrifying movie, or subtly repeating in his muscles
the "movements" of a piece of music.

And using exactly the

same process, the mystic who gazes at the heavens expands his

own mind to their vast grandeur, and feels in himself the

power and the glory of creation.

The same is true when the

theorist tries to remake, to imitate, some aspect of the world
in his theory.

We change what we imitate.

What was external to us

becomes now an affect of ours, or a muscular movement of ours,
or an image, or a concept, or all of these together.

The

thing has been reduplicated, but more accurately it has been
translated.

Finally, we do not know the thing; we know our

kinesthetic, affective, aesthetic, conceptual response to the

^^Cited by Herbert Ginsburg and Sylvia Opper,
Development (New Jersey:

i^iacret's Th eory
Intellectual
i-'roucice Hall, 1969), p. 61.
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thing.

We know of it what we feel in
ourselves to be consonant or dissonant with it. We know
it insofar as we have

internalized it, and have internalized
it only insofar as we
have imitated it.
Thus imitation does not mean a
passive
repetition.
act.

it is a creative act.

Knowing is a creative

We know, not the thing, but the thing
as we know it.
The process of imitation or of symbolization
is a

double process, operating half concretely
and half abstractly.
Our response to the environment is bipolar,
and results in
bipolar symbolism. On the first level, it is
affective and

kinesthetic, personal and subjective, preconscious
takes the form of dynamic images.

,

and

On the second level it

is rational, impersonal, conscious, analytic,
and takes

the form of strict concepts and of the logical
relations

among such concepts.

Abstract symbolism deals in concepts

rather than images, and is more given to analysis than to

emotional empathy

.

It is uncomfortable with slippery mean-

ings or double meanings, and tries to nail to each word

a

<^sfinition and to each proposition a single structure

and to each conversation a single form.

Its process is not

playful imitation of external objects or people, but the
inner circuits of purely formal, purely logical relations.
In essence,

it is logic and mathematics, and is correspond-

ingly univocal and formal.
a

It is the kind of thing satirized

number of years ago by the "Beyond The Fringe" comedy group

''

'

'

'
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from Oxford.

A man imitating Bertrand Russell "remembered"

being visited on one occasion by the eminent logician,
G.E.
Moore, who was carrying a basket full of apples,
Moore,

I

said,

"do you have some apples in that

basket? "
'

"No,

he said.

"

'"Moore,"

I

said,

"do you then have any apples in

that basket?"
'

"No,

he said

"

'"Moore,"

I

.

said,

"do you then have apples in that

basket?"
'

"Yes

,

"

he said

.

This kind of abstract symbolic form is the in-house

critic of the imagination, just as the imagination is the

permanent subverter of logic.

Taken together in their uneasy

union, they constitute our fundamental response to reality:

SYMBOL

concrete
I

kinesthetic, affective
I

imagistic
I

personal, subjective
I

metaphoric in meaning
[

felt

formal
I

rational, analytic
I

conceptual
I

impersonal, critical
I

univocal in meaning
I

syllogistic
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These are two distinct types of responses, not

duplicate systems.
other.

One is not there as a back-up for the

Yet they are related.

A glance at the two columns

shows how much in contrast they stand to each other, so

that we might be tempted to see them as related only by

opposition, each being able to stand without the other,

each

resenting" the other.

Indeed, much of our academic

tradition assumes ^ust this opposition, and treats emotion
srid

imagination as the natural enemies of disciplined

reason, and vice versa.

To the extent that it makes and

acts on that assumption the tradition is epistemologically
and pedagogically invalid.

Jean Piaget has demonstrated repeatedly throughout
his work that the items in the second column develop from
the items in the first.

Ha does. not, however, make Jung's

mistake, which we have already discussed, and v/hich can be

restated in our present terms this way:

Jung absolutizes

the first column and all but annihilates the second as a

significant factor in our response to reality.

He further,

and even more drastically, treats the imagination's metaphors

not as metaphors, but as primary realities.

Thus, he makes

of the elements of the first column, not a mode of response

to environment, but the actual environment to which we are

responding.

Not only do the archetypal metaphors have veto

power over the concepts and syllogisms of reason, they furthermore have veto power over all the other, lesser metaphors of
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the imagination, so that in effect the
archetypal metaphors

cease to be metaphors at all, and become the
primary natural
givens of the environment. They usurp the function
of reality itself.

This is a fundamental error.

It IS an error Piaget does not make.

His basic idea

is that our mental functions develop through
interactions

with our environment, and that simultaneously the actual
state of our developing mental functions determines what we
can take in of our environment.

The first process Piaget

calls accomodation, the second assimilation.

They are the

two moments of our mental interaction with environment.

This theory stresses the interrelationship
between the knower and the known in the act
of discovering reality with each element making
a more or less equal contribution.
Piaget
consequently acknowledges the importance of
the environment which undoubtedly determines
the development of thought to a certain extent.
Obviously the type of experience he acquires
and the situation to which he is exposed will
channel the child's mental performance. But
they will not determine development entirely
because the child in no instance comes to a
situation with a tabula rasa
He comes with
a mental structure, or accumulation of past
experience in the form of schemes, and these
will influence his apprehension of reality.
This means that for the child reality is not
an objective phenomenon which has its own
independent existence. Reality is determined
by the type of structure with which it is
apprehended. The reality of a 4-year-old
child is not the same as that of a 7-year-old,
Yet
nor the same as that of a 14-year-old.
the different "realities" are equally legitim.ate, since the things that a 4-year-old
sees and believes are as real to him as the
things a 14-year-old sees and believes. For
a child in the preoperational period, his
.

^

.
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world does, in fact, present the various characteristics which constitute the expressions
of thought of this stage of development.
For
him liguid does indeed change in form as well
as in quantity or size, just as for him a row
of candies does become longer and contain more
when the spatial layout is changed. So Piaget
feels that the role of the knower and the
development of his mental or cognitive structures is very important in the dual relationship between knower and known. As the one
changes, so does the other. With development
the child acquires a less superficial view
of reality.
Knowledge proceeds from the
periphery to the center of reality, but at
each level there is a constant interaction
between the knower and the external world.
The full version of Piaget's theory is quite complex,
and is not made any easier by the elaborate vocabulary he
has couched it in.
the core of it.

For our purpose we need deal only with

According to him, the main device we use

to accomplish the accomodation-assimilation interaction with

environment is that we imitate the environment.

In Piaget's

view, the imitation of it is at first physical and kinesthetic,

then is internalized on the level of concrete imagination,
and finally is completely internalized and abbreviated on the
level of formal concepts.

These three main phases of develop-

ment Piaget calls the Sensorimotor Phase, the Phase of Concrete
Operations, and the Phase of Formal Operations

.

^

At this last stage of "formal operations" the mind at
last comes in to its own, and operates by the rules of its own

^

(N.Y.:

^

Ibid

.

,

p

.

217

^^Cf. J. McV. Hunt, Intelligence and Experience
Ronald Press Co., 1961), chap. 5 & 6.
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inner logic.

Piaget identifies this inner logic with the

sixteen binary operations of two— valved propositional logic,
and with the so-called INRC group of logical operations.

Complex as such a description is, it probably would not be
complex enough for prgponants of symbolic logic.

But if

Piaget were to look at our earlier diagram of the two kinds
of symbols he would no doubt call the first column "concrete

operations" and the second "formal operations."

He would

further state that the concrete leads to and is assumed into
the formal.

Thus:

Concrete operations

>

Formal operations

>

rational, analytic

imagistic

>

conceptual

personal, subjective

>

impersonal, critical

metaphoric in meaning

>

univocal in meaning

felt

>

syllogistic

kinesthetic, affective

—

What is more, he speaks of the formal operations as
being essentially adult operations.

In this sense, the ado-

lescent is, in Piaget's view, essentially adult since he is

capable of formal propositional logic.

But most of Piaget's

American interpreters go on mistakenly to understand him to

mean that therefore the concrete operations are essentially
the childish way of operating, and are immature when done
by an adult.

Most of his American followers set things up so

that the relation:
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emotion

:

reason

:

concept;

is the same as the relation:

image

and that is the same as the relation:

metaphoric meaning

:

univocal meaning;

that is the same as the relation:

child

:

adult.

Affective and kinesthetic imitation, imagination, and

metaphor

—

these are, then, the things of a child.

This view

is sometimes attributed to Piaget, along with the view that

the adult is to be defined exclusively in terms of abstract
reason.
fact,

But Piaget's own viev; is quite different.

It is,

in

identical with the view of the present study, namely,

that the mind never outgrows concrete symbolism in its thought

processes.

The experiential, concrete, personal, subjective

dimensions of thought feed, support, and even correct the
more formal and abstract dimensions.

The fullness of the

adult mind, in Piaget's view, requires skill in the use of
the concrete operations, as well as of the formal ones.
It is our contention that Piaget's model of childhood

development is essentially correct, and is in fact
rigorously formalized common sense.

a

sort of

But for some reason, most

of his interpreters in America set up a model of adulthood

that seems to be more a formalized violation of common sense

—

not that it is wrong so far as it goes, but that it is so impov-

erished and incomplete.

By leaving themselves open to the

.
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interpretation that the "concrete operations" are
immature
and that the "formal" are the only mature ones, they
have

in effect struck from the world of adults the
fullness of

imaginative, emotive, and imitative life, have given no

importance to adult play, and have put into some closet of
the mind that rich store of fantasy that gives us all our

metaphors and that is the mainspring of all our sciences
and arts.
9-t

Such a model of the adult mind is not the adult

all, but a residue of it after everything not unigue

to it has been boiled off.

But when an adult emerges from

the child he once was, he does not leave everything behind.

Piaget seems to know better than many of his followers that
the adult does not keep the childhood things only as left-

overs or mementoes or vestiges.

The adult leaves behind

from childhood only what were not basic life-long skills,
but keeps from childhood the things that were and continue
to be basic skills.

Among those things are what Piaget calls

the concrete operations, which, in the adult, are the skills

of creative imagination and metaphoric thought, as important
in science as in art,

and as adult as any exercise of formal

logic
The double symbolism, concrete and formal, by which

according to Piaget, we transform reality mentally is also the
tool which makes it possible for us to transform it physically
By means of the double symbolism we own and manipulate the

world.

Before the advent of the symbol-making mind of man,

.

;
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the creative initiative in life belonged to nature's
triad:
G

<

>

0

<

>

But somehow

En.

at the reason and at the mechanism

itself into mind:

(G

<

0

>

—
—

<

>

we are still guessing

nature went beyond
En)

>R.

And now

the initiative is reversed, or at least is no longer so one-

sided as it was:

(G

<

>

0

<

>

En)

<

Looked at

R,

one way man is nature's creature, looked at another way he
is its creator.

By the power of his symbol-making mind he

creates the metaphoric structures (R

>

m)

by which in-

creasingly he influences the very course of nature.

R

<

En<-

>

M

stands for structures created by
the mind;

M

the process within the mind; the
subject of science of psychology;
basic concern of education; the
origins of art;

M

a)

b)
c)
d)

0

<•

Consider:

M

appropriation of nature by art;
appropriation of nature by science;
cultural environment created by man
sciences by which man studies his
own cultural product;

all the sciences of the living body;
medicine; comparative anatomy;
zoology; botony; etc
.

G

<

M

the ultimate life-science, genetics;
the point at which life-science and
"natural" science meet at the
molecular level.

That is a sketch of how the mind structures experience
in the making of connections, comparisons, metaphors.

,

CHAPTER

III

THE USES OF METAPHOR

Metaphor is a luatter of taking one thing in terms of
another.

It is the making of comparisons.

The rhetoricians

of ancient times took rather too much pleasure in distin-

guishing it from other figures of speech (simile, hyperbole,
apostrophe, etc.)

and by so doing made it seem as one

verbal trick among many.

It is,

first, not a trick at all,

but a serious device whereby the mind understands things by

comparing them to each other.

Further, it is not exclusively

verbal because comparisons can be made on a visual basis as
well, or auditory, or kinesthetic, etc.

Most important,

however, is that the making and using of metaphor is not

one more am.ong the many curious things the mind can do.
is,

It

together with the ability to think univocally and logi-

cally
skill.

—

that is, non -metaphorically

—

the most basic mental

By being conceptual and discursive man can be clear

and consistent in his thoughts and his communications.

By

being imagistic and associative he can be creative in them.
The subject of metaphoric thought is vast, but it is

intelligible.

Perhaps we can introduce it by means of a some-

what elaborate example, but one which nevertheless is clear,
and which illustrates the basic uses of metaphor.

Following

,

:
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is a passage from Shakespeare's Richard
II.

^

The king has

just received a message that Henry Bolingbroke,
whom he had
exiled as a traitor, has returned to England with
an army
and is at this very hour riding toward the king
to overthrow
him.

The king responds to this alarming news by saying
to

his courtiers
...of comfort no man speak.
Let s talk of graves, of worms, and epitaphs.
Make dust our paper, and with rainy eyes.
Write sorrow on the bosom of the earth.
Let's choose executors and talk of wills-And yet not so, for what can we bequeath.
Save our deposed bodies to the ground?
Our lands, our lives, and all are Bolingbroke s
And nothing can we call our own but death;
And that small model of the barren earth.
Which serves as paste, and cover to our bones.
For God's sake let us sit upon the ground,
And tell sad stories of the death of kings.
How some have been deposed, some slain in war.
Some haunted by the ghosts they have deposed,
Some poisoned by their wives, some sleeping killed.
All murdered.
For within the hollow crovm
That rounds the mortal temples of a king
Keeps Death his court, and there the antic sits.
Scoffing his state and grinning at his pomp.
Allowing him a breath, a little scene,
To monarchize, be feared, and kill with looks.
Infusing him with self and vain conceit.
As if this flesh which walls about our life
Were brass impregnable; and humored thus.
Comes at the last and with a little pin
Bores through his castle wall, and farewell king!
Cover your heads, and mock not flesh and blood.
With solemn reverence; throw away respect.
Tradition, form, and ceremonious duty.
For you have but mistook me all this while.
I live with bread like you, feel want.
Taste grief, need friends; subjected thus.
How can you say to me I am a king?
'

,

^Shakespeare, Richard II, III. ii. 146 ff.

.

)
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Images of death (let us call them M^) obviously

dominate the king's mind.

Under the circumstances this

is entirely to be expected

—

except that the images are

of the king's death, not the death of his enemies.

expectations are reversed here.

Our

Instead of images of

counterattack and self-defense, we get images of despair
and sad resignation

—

images that prevent the king from

calling on his own capacity to fight back

(E

<

M)

.

The

Bishop of Carlisle, one of Richard's counsellors, sees what
the problem is, and tries to reverse the king's feelings

by giving a different meaning to the metaphoric images that

express them

(M,

r

'

My lord, wise men ne'er sit and wail their woes.
But presently prevent the ways to wail.
To fear the foe, since fear oppresseth strength.
Gives in your weakness strength unto your foe.
And so your follies fight against yourself.
Fear and be slain, no worse can come to fight.
And fight and die, is death destroying death.
While fearing dying pays death servile breath.
For the moment at least the king snaps out of his self-pity,

changes his m.etaphors, and accepts the role of attacker and
avenger
Let us take a closer look at what work the metaphors
are doing in these passages.

First, the metaphors enable the

king to express his overwhelming feeling of being deathbound
(E

>

M)

:

nothing can we call our own but death.

.

71

Richard orchestrates these profoundly expressive
images
so skillfully that, not only does he
manifest his

own feel-

ings of mortality, but he expresses for
everyone else pres-

ent their feelings of the same thing.

Richard sings an

aria here that expresses one of the most universal
of human

feelings
But he is doing more than just giving a form to
feeling.

He is also defining the context of his present

situation.
ing monarchs

He reads the history books and sees only bleed-

—

his predecessors in danger and death.

The

universal condition of mortal man is most emphatically the

condition of the king, and death not only will visit him

eventually but it will stalk him every day.
the kingly context, which is his own,

as.

Richard defines

not just death but

murder, not just weakness but victimhood, not just danger
but absolute helplessness.

His images, therefore, in

addition to expressing his inward feelings

(E

>

M)

,

also define the public, historical, even cosmic context of
his whole life

(E

<

M)

.

They therefore pre-structure

how he will experience such bad news as he has. just received;
he can only receive it as a death-knell.

it as a call to arms.

He cannot receive

The metaphor here preceeds the exper-

ience and determines what it will taste like.
To push the matter further, the image which defines

the context of one’s experience dictates thereby what he can

s

.
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^ with

that experience.

For the course of action one

will take is a function, not so much of
his situation
itself, as of how he sees that situation.
For Richard
the image of universal kingly assassination
makes only
one course of action possible, and it is the
one he actually takes:
to sit upon the ground and tell
sad stories.

It is not, of course, the only way he could
act in the

situation

And it is not the way Carlisle will allow him to
act.

In his brief speech he manages to reverse the impact

of the king's metaphors

)

and therefore at least momen-

2

tarily to alter the course of action.

First, images of

death indeed express the inner king, but now it is to be
the king as death-dealer.

Secondly, the images of death

do indeed define the context, but it is to be Bolingbroke

context rather than the king's.

Accordingly, these reinter

preted images indicate the proper course of action:
fight."

'

"And

The bishop suggests alternative metaphors, hence

alternative ways for the king to understand himself and his
policy.

Shakespeare enables us here to see the two fundamental functions of metaphor:
experience, and

^

express inner feeling or

define the context within which one will

experience new things and make his practical decisions.

He

also helps us to see that not all metaphors are equally use
ful for either of these purposes, that some are far too
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limiting and therefore defeating.
into that defeat.

But he does not lock us

He makes it clear that there are always

alternative possibilities

—

new metaphors that better

express the inner life, and new metaphors that, because
they

better define the context in which we function, yield
more

useful approaches to the particular problems we are trying
to solve.

There is always a Carlisle worth listening to.
Thus:

a)

we create metaphoric structures to give
shape to our experience, to express what
being alive in the world has felt like
to us.
This is Expressive Metaphor;
E

b)

M.

>

once those metaphors are there, they not
only continue to express our experience
of reality but they also control our
experience of reality. Expressive Metaphor structures what we have felt or are
feeling
Contextual Metaphor pre-structures what we will experience: E <
M.
It thereby also pre-structures what we will
do
For decision-making and problem-solving
are at root matters of setting up contextual
metaphors within which to understand what
we are dealing with.
,

.

»

In this chapter we will investigate the two main functions
of metaphor.

For the mind's increasing ability to structure

its experience,

to create and to recreate its knowledge, to

control its environment, to extend its influence more and more

through the whole range of being, is the product of making

significant connections, significant metaphors.

Expressive Metaphor
The basic level of experience, after the purely

biological, is emotional.

Emotion is the first level

chronologically and epistemologically

—

of our past, pres-

ent, and future interactions with our world.
to the phase of the "concrete operations."

It belongs

We "like" what

we contact or we don't; we desire or fear it, hunger for
it, become angry with it.

We first know things by knowing

our feelings about those things.

Not only do the emotions

supply the energy of human projects, they are, after biology
itself, the infrastructure of human knowledge.

More even

than that, they are the first object of that knowledge.

To

be aware of his fundamental interactions with his world,

his fundamental experience, man m.ust be able to name his

feeling, to express them to himself and to others in a
His knowledge never becomes
2

so sophisticated it has no root in feeling, so abstract it

does not imply and structure some passion.

Though all feelings are personal to the one who experiences them, many of those feelings are also shared by others,
and are in that sense public or cultural.

And some of the

culturally shared feelings of reality are so deep and embracing
that they constitute a society's most basic and most universal
Emotional experience, then, can be purely

attitude toward life.
personal, or cu ltural

,

or what

v;e

will be calling mythic

purposes of schematizing we will call these

Ej^,

.

E2/ and E^*

For

:
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All of these dimensions of people's emotional

interactions with reality have to be expressed and struc-

tured in ways appropriate to them.

A purely personal

feeling needs no more than a personally meaningful metaphor to express it, while a feeling shared widely throughout a culture needs a metaphor recognized and shared by

that whole culture, and

a

culturally shared feeling of

the ultimate values and purposes of life needs something

like a full-fledged myth to express it:

^2

(personal)

>

(cultural)

>

(mythic)

>

These, then, are the three levels of expressive

metaphor, whose purpose it is to articulate the emotional
bases of knowledge.

In terms of broad influence in struc-

turing the emotional life, metaphors of the mythic type are

clearly the most powerful because they tend to have a kind
of veto power over cultural

foms

and personal tendencies.

If the base of the triangle stands for the largest influence,

we hav^

Mythic
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Still, every expressive metaphor begins
as the

creation of some private person, no matter how
culturally

sanctioned it may come to be in time.

in this sense, all

cultural and all mythic metaphors began their existence
simply as metaphors that were personally meaningful
to
someone.

We think, for example, of how Christianity has

followed the pattern of the personal experience of St. Paul.
Private metaphors gain a public hold by being as helpful
and meaningful to many other people as they are to their

creators.

And they continue to derive their value and their

existence only to the extent that they are personally meaningful.

When they fail of that, they become part of the

baggage of history.

In terms of ultimate authority and

influence, then, the diagram would look like this:

Clearly, the three kinds of expressive metaphor inter-

penetrate each other.

Even to say there are "three kinds"

is no more than a useful fiction.

We will use the distinction

to help structure our discussion of expressive metaphor, but

that implies no suggestion that the three categories are

radically distinct from each other.
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Personal Expressive Metaphor
There are two kinds of personal expressive metaphor:

the kind psychiatry has paid most of its attention to,
and
all the others.

The first kind are the pathological meta-

phors one generates that either unconsciously disguise or
create ambiguities about what one is really feeling.

The

others are not pathological, and, though they are generally
not fully conscious, they are truly and rather clearly ex-

pressive of what one is feeling.
In the first, the connection of the metaphor to

emotional experience is not clear, and some sort of therapy
may be needed to bring about any degree of clarity.
of E

>

M,

Instead

the situation is:

appa

For example, a patient signals his feelings by shrieking at
the doctor.

In most cases such a behavioral metaphor means

that the patient does not want the doctor around.

But it is

possible, as the following remarks of one of

Laing’s

patients makes clear, that the metaphor is

R.

in.

D.

fact expressive

of a quite different emotion:

Patients kick and scream and fight when
they're not sure the doctor can see them.
It's a most terrifying feeling to realize
that the doctor can't see the real you,
that he can't understand what you feel and
that he's just going ahead with his own
ideas.
I would start to feel that I was
invisible or maybe not there at all. I

^

,

78

had to make an uproar to see if the
doctor
would respond to me, not just to his own
ideas
.

The danger of expressing oneself through
patholog-

ically ambiguous metaphors is profound.
uses to express his feeling to others

The metaphor one

(^1)

is,

for them,

metaphoric of some other feeling, and they will assume
he
must mean what they themselves would mean by the same metaFor example, one of Laing's patients "said of

•

her mother and father that they were not her real parents,

that they were not

a

husband and wife, or a mother and father,

but simply a pair of business partners.
be a delusion.

In fact,

^

This was taken to

it was a metaphor that expressed

exquisitely what the daughter felt.

The person who seeks to

express his emotion through purely idiosyncratic metaphors
runs a clear risk;

Interviewer
R^th

:

;

But do you feel you have to
agree with v/hat most of the people
around you believe?
Well if I don't I usually end up in
the hospital.

And the chances are good that one will not even be clear to
oneself, so tenuous sometimes is the connection of metaphor
to feeling.

^R.

D.

Laing, ibid., p. 166.

^R. D. Laing and A. Esterson, Sanity
Madness and
the Family (Harmondsworth England: P'enguin Books Ltd.,
,

,

1970)

p.

77.

''Ibid.,

p.

175.

,

:
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Not all psychiatry deals with the
pathological

extremes that Laing does, but all of it deals
with personal metaphors that express one's feelings in

an obscure,

encoded manner.

Carl Jung spent a career decoding the

mystifying images that swirl around in dreams.

And Eric

Berne has done much of his work decoding the often
con-

voluted meaning of the metaphoric "games" through which
people deal

each other.

v/ith

Whether in the depths of

dreams or in the nuances of social intercourse, psychiatry

metaphors that are anti— expressive until they are
decoded, but that are highly expressive once the code has

been cracked.

Berne describes a "game" in which one person

gets another at a complete disadvantage, pretends to be
solicitous, while actually rubbing salt in wounds:

Thesis

Aim

:

Roles

Now I've got you, you son of a bitch.
Justification.
:

:

Victim, Aggressor.

Dynamics

;

Examples

:

Jealous rage.
I caught you this time.
Jealous husband.

(1)
(2)

Social paradigm
Adult-adult.
Adult:
"See, you have done wrong."
Adult:.
"Now that you draw it to my attention, I guess I have."
:

Psychological paradigm
Parent-child.
Parent:
"I've been watching you, hoping
you'd make a slip."
Child:
"You caught me this time."
Parent:
"Yes, and I'm going to let you
feel the full force of my fury."^
:

^Eric Berne, Games People Play
1967)

,

p.

86.

(N.Y.

Grove Press,
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Here the ambiguity of presented metaphor may be semi-

deliberate, but still it is largely coming out of obscured motives.

Besides those pathological and misguiding metaphors which psychiatry exists to decipher and correct,
there is an immense range of genuinely expressive ones

through which people constantly, if informally, define
their feelings for themselves
E,

other about them

(

>

M,

(E
.

^1)
Mp

•

>

M)

and signal each

Generally we disregard

them as trivial, but we would not consider them altogether
so if we reflected that it is in the area of personal ex-

pressive metaphor that most people make most of the creative choices of their lives and exercise most of their

sensitivity and intelligence.

Although the choice of one's

favorite color, breed of dog, style of dress, music, house,
flower, and friend will not shake the State nor distress

the orbit of Jupiter, it nevertheless is of immense importance
to the man or woman who has such choice to make.

For the only

basis on which it can be made is pure personal feeling.

The

choice is right if it fits one's emotional being, wrong if it
does not.

No other standard applies.

We are here in the

world of radical subjectivity, and everyone is in that world

much of the time.

However influencea one's feelings may be

by the culture around him, and no matter how much or little

of his own expressive metaphors may be sanctioned by that

culture

El

T^)

(

a core of
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<
,

he is still aware of himself as having

purely private experience

(E^)

,

and aware of the

private ways he has of representing it to himself
and of building it into the fabric of his life.

(E

>

M)

In circum-

scribed but absolutely authentic ways people express themselves by the objects they surround themselves

the

v/ith,

clothes they like to wear, the jokes they find funny, the
dreams they have for the future and the careers they choose
in the present, the movies they like, their ways of relaxing,

their behavior with money

—

an all but endless sequence of

small decisions which are based on pure subjectivity and

which, taken together, constitute a single complex expres-

sive metaphor whose purpose is to say, "This is who

I

am."

It is, indeed, in matters such as these that we can

see most clearly the first pattern of conscious life:

expression of feeling through significant form.

the

In every

other department of life emotional factors tend to be overlooked.

Scientists say science is objective, observational,

unemotional.

Politicians say that they rein in their feel-

ings and remain impartial.

Army men like to portray them-

selves as the reasonable agents of reasonable policies.

But

if we read the letters of the scientist or the diary of the

politician or eavesdrop as the general talks in his sleep, we
will find more than detached, rational observations arranged
logically around a central pellucid thesis.

There is another

core within that core, and it is made of feelings:

perhaps
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the scientist's purely emotional need of order, perhaps

the politician's drive to establish and defend personal

territory, perhaps the general's purely subjective taste
for drama and conflict.

Such private feelings are not

minor impurities in the otherwise objective worlds of
science, statecraft, and arms.

Such feelings are exactly

what gets expressed through the forms supplied by those
worlds.

Those great public worlds exist in order to

express just such private feelings.

Insignificant in comparison as one's choice of
clothes may seem, or one's preference in living rooms,

nevertheless these minor matters are one
those major ones.

process with

And they have the advantage of not

being tricked out as purely rational, objective decisions
that have to be made by accurate men.

Everyone concedes

them to be no one else's business but one's own and to
rest on nothing but personal preference.

Even allowing for

the influence of dress codes and shifting norms of fashion,

here fantasy and feeling are allowed -- allowed, perhaps,
within- limits, but allowed.

Here people can rearrange much

of their immediate world until it is the color and shape

they want it to be.

It may even be that in our present

culture these apparently insignificant choices constitute
the first and, as yet, the only school of expressive metaphor.
Elsev/here we may be unwilling to admit we are indulging in
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the metaphoric revelation of feelings, but here
we can

acknowledge it and practice it for its own sake.

More-

over, it is entirely possible that an individual will

never know what the range of his own feelings is until
he has tried out a range of metaphors as potential expres-

of them.
is not uniform,

ture it.

As we have said earlier, one's experience
and neither are the metaphors that struc-

People need to be able to try out alternative

personal metaphors, not for the sake of novelty, but for
the sake of possessing increasingly their own lives.
II

.

Cultural Expressive Metaphor
Very much the same process goes on in societies as

in individuals.

The individual expresses and defines his

experience through metaphoric structures
cultures

(^2^

•

(M^)

,

and so do

Indeed, a metaphor becomes cultural only

because many people have found it to be expressive of how
they personally feel.

Immediately however we run into

a

complication here.

The cultural metaphor may be not so much expressing people's
feelings

(E

feelings

(E

>

<

as controlling

M)

M)

.

,

or setting up, people's

Looked at one way, a cultural meta-

phor is the metaphorized product of shared feeling.

Looked

at another way those feelings are the product of the cultural

metaphor.

In the first case we are dealing with expressive

metaphor, in the second with contextual metaphor.

As the

metaphor becomes more and more widely accepted as meaningful
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It loses its idiosyncratic quality
and its roots in uniquely
personal experience, it automatically
becomes more and more
normative, in the way described by Dr
R. j. Kaufmann:
.

Metaphor is... that particular phase
of
symbolic activity which directs
attention
delimits reference, and relates
private
desire to p^ublic necessity
Metaphor is
to^the need for codified or normalized
values to public ways of seeing and
feeling, what lav;s are to sciences
and
general concepts are to discursive thinking.
Metaphor simplifies what would otherwise be too complex to evolve a normative
—
response
(Emphasis mine.) ^
'

.

,

.

Sometimes it is exceedingly difficult to
determine

whether

a

cultural metaphor is following public feeling
or

leading it, expressing or shaping it.

The question is more

than academic, for to the extent that such
metaphor is no

longer generated out of felt experience but rather is
only

generati^ pseudo-experience, it
a

is a dead metaphor, at best

piece of flotsam from a dead cause, at worst a shrinking
and

strangling of people's lives.
In the following section we will try to suggest how

cultural metaphors express collective feelings.
the title of Contextual Metaphor,

v/e

Later, under

will discuss briefly how

they manipulate it, sometimes for profit and sometimes for los
We look briefly now at law, art, and science as expres
sive metaphors.

^R.

J.

There are of course other levels that would

Kaufmann, "Metaphorical Thinking and the Scope
XXX (October 1968), p. 42.

of the 7\rts," College English

,

s
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illustrate cultural expressive metaphor.

These three are

only illustrative of the point.
(a)

Law as Expressive Metaphor

Few countries illustrate as clearly as the United
States the expressive function of law.

The reason is that

most nations cannot find the single, definitive moment at
which they sat down and decided what their legal system would
They have a harder time than the USA of saying, This is

be.

our law.

Americans can and do point to their Constitution

as being their national self-expression in the form of law.

Looked at as cultural expressive metaphor, as being
the structuring of shared emotions, the Constitution is a

fascinating document.
of our feelings,

For not only does it express the unity

it also expresses their disunity.

It quite

frankly acknov;ledges and sanctions the thirst for power and
for aggressive competition so enjoyed among us.

nothing to sweeten that beast.
expresses everyone

'

It does

On the contrary, the Constitution

desire for power, to an extent that few

legal systems have ever done.

But it also expresses the opposite desire for harmony
and family feeling in the nation.
ing so, however.

ticularly tender.
ov-

'

It is not romantic about do-

The "family feeling" it expresses is not par-

This is to be a family of competitors

whe lining father-figure here

—

(such as a king disguised as

no

,
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president

)

no overwhelming mother-figures

^3-tiorial church)

,

but no endless fratricidal struggle for

the power of the deposed parents either:
a

(such as a

piece of the pie for everybody.

so far as possible,

America was (and

is)

a

tense family, and expressed itself as such in its first law.

The Constitution expresses too our very mixed feelings both about government and about individualism.

careful ground rules it sets up

practical form of government.

a

By its

very strong, clever,

And then, by the Bill of Rights,

that afterthought, it all but takes away from that govern-

ment all the traditional powers of government.

But while

granting to the individual so much autonomy, it nevertheless
sanctions slavery, and, by means of such devices as the

Electoral College, stays very far away from anything like a

direct democracy.

Indeed, the makers of the Constitution

expressed the tensions within our collective feelings so well
that they even risked miring the law in sheer contradiction.'
The development of the Supreme Court as defender-

interpreter of the Constitution is the most striking indication of the enduring American wish to maintain -the law's

character as expressive metaphor.

The Court has no function

other than to keep the national laws, institutions, and behavior
as far as possible expressive of the basic national sentiments

that have been approximately

,

usefully

,

but not definitively

expressed through the text of the Constitution.

The Supreme

Court is there to see that the metaphor continues to be expressive.

a

87
(t>)

Art as Expressive Metaphor

Art is another kind of cultural expressive metaphor.

Whether art is viewed as the expression of the individual
artist

s,

or as the collected shared expression of the members

of a culture

and it can be viewed both ways,

—

it depends

for its expressiveness on the clarity of its metaphoric form.
is expression, but,

as Susanne Langer points out,

self-expression requires no artistic form."^

"Sheer

"Art," she says

elsewhere, "is the creation of forms symbolic of human feeling

" ®
.

Mrs. Langer has written extensively on the arts from

this point of view.

She first formulated her key idea in terms

of music specifically:

...music is not self-expression, but
formulation and representation of emotions,
moods, mental tensions and resolutions
"logical picture" of sentient, responsive
life, a source of insight, not a plea for
sympathy.
Feelings revealed in music are
essentially not "the passion, love or longing of such-and-such an individual," inviting us to put ourselves in that individual's
place, but are presented directly to our
understanding, that we may grasp, realize,
comprehend these feelings, without pretending to have them or imputing them to anyone
else.
Just as words can describe events we
have not witnessed, places and things we
have not seen, so music can present emotions
and moods we have not felt, passions we did

—

^Susanne K. Langer, Philosophy in
Mentor Books, 1951), p. 184.

a

New Key (N.Y.:

^Susanne K. Langer, Feeling an d Form (N.Y.:
Scribner's Sons, 1953), p. 40.

Charles

^

:
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not know before.
its subject-matter is
the same as that of "self-expression,"
and its symbols may even be borrowed,
upon occasion, from the realm of expressive symptoms; yet the borrowed suggestive elements are formalized, and the
subject-matter "distanced" in an artistic
perspective
.

Later, beautifully summarizing this first step of her now

expanded theory, she v/rote
The tonal structures we call "music"
bear a close logical similarity to the
forms of human feeling forms of growth
and of attenuation, flowing and stowing,
conflict and resolution, speed, arrest,
terrific excitement, calm, or subtle
activation and dreamy lapses not joy
and sorrow perhaps, but the poignancy
of either and both the greatness and
brevity and eternal passing of everything vitally felt.
Such is the pattern,
or logical form, of sentience; and the
pattern of music is that same form worked
out in pure, measured sound and silence.
Music is a tonal analogue of emotive life.
Such formal analogy, or congruence
of logical structures, is the prime
requisite for the relation between a symbol and v;hatever it is to mean.
The symbol and the object symbolized must have
some common logical form.^®

—

—

—

The "congruence of logical structures":
a

the form of

work of art is congruent with the processes of one's emotions.

Art differs from what we have called personal expressive metaphor in its much heavier emphasis on form.

And it is by reason

of that same form that art can be publicly expressive as well
as personally so.

The "logical structure" of a work of art is

'^Langer, Key

p.

,

^^Langer, Form

,

p.

188.
27.
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congruent not only with the artist's own emotional
processes, but with that of many other people as well.

The

artist expresses himself, but the art work expresses
more
than himself.
are

it expresses also anyone else whose emotions

congruent" with the form the artist has created.

That

is why we do not have to be a culture of practicing
artists

for art to be a metaphor expressive of us.
(c)

Science as Expressive Metaphor

We have been discussing how a culture builds both
its public institutions and its art around the principle of

expressive metaphor.

But we said at the beginning of this

part of our discussion that science, too, that most objective-

seeming thing, can be seen under this same rubric.

Science

itself has a root in feeling, and is one of the forms through

which feeling is expressed.
Science is commonly thought of as a matter of gathering facts, connecting them, drawing logical conclusions from

them.

But which facts will be gathered, which will be connected

to which and how and why, and toward what conclusions their

combinations will be applied, these are matters not at all of
fact but of preference, in other v/ords, of subjectivity.
is evidence,

of feeling.

Science

but it is evidence used very largely as a servant

90

W© will exemplify this idea through the famous

problem of whether the earth or the sun stands at the
center of things, or neither.

To a great extent all the

ways of answering the question can be defended by observable facts.

An enormous number of everyday observations

confirms the view that the earth is rather flat and perfectly static, and that everything in the heavens revolves

around it.

There also is a great number of less apparent

but equally unarguable observations that go toward proving

that the sun as it the center.

And, as of Einstein's

General Relativity Theory, the whole question becomes
irrelevant.

Seen from

a

higher ground it makes no differ-

ence at all.
But the facts pure and simple which were offered as

evidence were never enough to establish geocentrism, heliocentrism, or relativity.
is metaphorized emotion,

power.

Fore each of these systems also
and therein has been much of their

Geocentrism expresses in

a

cosmological way the

culture-wide feeling that the human world is the central,
definitive one; that all powers are powers either for or
against man; that the surrounding order of nature is the

vehicle of the gods' concern for man; that all creation is
there to supply a home for man.

That feeling, even more than

the observed facts, has been at the root of the theoretical

geocentrism of an earlier time and of the practical geocentrism of our own time.

:
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The system was changed partly because of altered

observations of fact, but largely also because of altered
feeling.

Newton rearranged the solar system partly for

reasons of mechanics and mathematics, but also for reasons
of emotionally expressive symbolism.

The sun, emblematic

of God, ought to be in the center, and the world's human

and infra-human orders ought properly to revolve around it.
It is no secret that Newton was a profoundly religious man, not
to say a mystic:

Late in his life he wrote, discussing the
Creator at the end of his book Opticks
'Such a wonderful uniformity in the Planetary
System must be allowed the Effect of Choice,'
that is, it must be admitted to come about
by design and not by chance.
That v/as his
belief throughout his life.^^
,

If the planetary system is the creation of the Christian deity,

why should it not be so constructed as to include Christian

symbolism?

It is known that Newton's religious feelings led

him to draw conclusions about things long before there was
either evidence or logic enough to warrant them:
...his friend, John Craig, a distinguished
but somewhat eccentric mathematician...,
says that (Newton) was much more concerned
with his inquiries into religion than into
science, and that the reason that he showed
the errors in Descartes' scheme was that he
thought it was used as a foundation for

disbelief

.

^

^

da C. Andrade
Anchor Books, 1954), p. 36.
^

^

.N.

ibid

.

,

p

.

12 0.

,

Sir Isaac Newton (N.Y.
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Newton likewise knew what his model of the solar system
would be before he could either explain or prove it, and
in part he "knew"

gious feeling.

it because it corresponded to his reli-

The heliocentric theory is not, of itself,

expressive metaphor; but in large part it began that way.
Finally, Einstein, who felt that neither traditional

man nor traditional God stood at the center of the universe,
had therefore no emotional stake in either the geocentric
or the heliocentric model.

Einstein saw science itself,

not the cosmos, as the reflector of man:

Einstein regards all physical concepts as
free creations of the human mind.
Science
is a creation of the human mind, a free
invention.
This freedom is restricted
only by our desire to fit the increasing
wealth of our experiences better and better
into a more and more logically satisfactory
^
scheme
.

^

If we are to find the non-f actual,

—

Einstein's science

emotive core of

that element of free creation -- we

look to the world of private fantasy:

Einstein told me how, since his boyhood, he
thought about the man running after the
light ray and the man closed in a falling
elevator.
The picture of the man running
after the light ray led to special relativity theory. The picture of the man in
a falling elevator led to general relativity theory
^

.

^Leopold Infeld, Albert Einstein (N.Y.:
Scribner's Sons, 1950), p. 121.
^

1

4

Ibid

.

,

p

.

48.

Charles
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Few theories in the history of science have been so
frankly
and boldly metaphoric as those of Einstein.

Not only the purely private world, but also the much
larger cultural one is built up around the unending attempt
to give adequate form to feeling, and, by the changing
of

metaphoric forms, to give feeling fuller range.

But even

larger in scope than either the personal or the cultural,

sometimes overruling them, always influencing them, is the

most powerful expressive metaphor of all;
Ill

.

Myth.

Mythic Expressive Metaphor

When we use the word "myth" colloquially we usually
mean something false, ill-conceived, prejudiced.

That myths,

like any other product of the mind, can lead us into gross

error is of course true.
us into error.

But it was not invented to lead

It was invented to lead us out of it.

Philosophers like Cassirer and Langer and scholars like

Mircea Eliade seem agreed that the fundamental stratum of
mental activity is the making of myths, and seem further agreed
that its purpose is to organize man's experience at

basic level.

a

very

The characters and plots found in the great

myths are elucidations of something.
first underotanding of himself.

Myths express man's

Myth is, first, the expression

of v;hat it is like to have a human mind, and,

it is like to have a human body.

second, of what
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First, myth expresses the power of mind, the power
of naming and structuring things.

Ernst Cassirer sees

both language and myth as having here very similiar functions:

Language moves in the middle kingdom
between the "indefinite" and the "infinite";
it transforms the indeterminate into a
determinate idea, and then holds it within
the sphere of finite determinations.
So
there are, in the realm of mythic and religious conception, "inef fables" of different
order, one of which represents the lower
limit of verbal expression, the other the
upper limit; but between these bounds, which
are drawn by the very nature of verbal expression, language can move with perfect freedom,
and exhibit all the wealth and concrete
exemplification of its creative power.
Here, again, the mythmaking mind exhibits
a sort of consciousness of the relationship
between its product and the phenomenon of
language, though characteristically it can
express this relationship not in abstract
logical terms, but only in images.
It
transforms the spiritual dawn which takes
place v;ith the advent of language into an
objective fact, and presents it as a
cosmogonic process.
The creation myths, then, are metaphoric of the origins
of mind

though literally about the origins of world.

,

the beginning

without mind.

v;as

The Word."

"In

World is there, but it is chaos

It is the function of the mind, whether that'

of the gods or of men, to name things and in the naming to

confer upon them a new kind of existence, a place in a pattern
of meaning.

^Ernst Cassirer, Language and Myth (N.Y.:
Publications Inc., 1953), p. 81.
^

Dover
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Creation myths are about the origins of a
humanly
meaningful cosmos, the emergence of the mind from

an ear-

lier chaos and muteness into a new realm where
everything
is reconstituted.

Carl Jung describes beautifully the

ancient mythic theme as the still fresh, still central

experience of a modern man:
From Nairobi we used a small Ford to
visit the Athi Plains, a great game preserve.
From a low hill in this broad savanna a
magnificent prospect opened out to us. To
the very brink of the horizon we saw gigantic
herds of animals: gazelle, antelope, gnu,
zebra, warthog, and so on.
Grazing, heads
nodding, the herds moved forward like slow
rivers.
There was scarcely any sound save
the melancholy cry of a bird of prey.
This
was the stillness of the eternal beginning,
the world as it had always been, in the
state of non-being; for until then no one
had been present to know that it was this
world.
I walked away from my companions
until I had put them out of sight, and
savored the feeling of being entirely alone.
There I was now, the first human being to
recognize that this was the world, but who
did not know that in this moment he had first
really created it.
There the cosmic meaning of consciousness
became overwhelmingly clear to me.
"What
nature leaves imperfect, the art perfects,"
say the alchemists.
Man, I, in an invisible
act of creation put the stamp of perfection
on the world by giving it objective existence.
This act we usually ascribe to the Creator
alone, without considering that in so doing
we view life as a machine calculated down
to the last detail, which, along with the
human psyche, runs on senselessly, obeying
foreknown and predetermined rules.
In such
a cheerless clockwork fantasy there is no
drama of man, world, and God; there is no
"new day" leading to "new shores," but only
the dreariness of calculated processes.
My old Pueblo friend came to my mind. He

96

thought that th© iraison d'©tir© of his pu©blo
had boen to h©lp thsir fathor, th© sun, to
cross th© sky ©ach day.
I had ©nvi©d him
for th© fulln©ss of moaning in that b©li©f,
and had b©©n looking about without hop© for
a myth of our own.
Now I know what it was,
and know ©von mor©
that man is indisponsabl©
for th© complotion of croation; that, in fact,
h© himsolf is th© socond croator of the world,
who alon© has given to th© world its objective
existence without which, unheard, unseen,
silently eating, giving birth, dying, heads
nodding through hundreds of millions of years,
it would have gone on in the profoundest
night of non-being down to its unknown end.
Human consciousness created objective existence
and meaning, and man found his indispensable
place in the great process of being.
:

—

We can say, then, that the creation myths in general
are metaphors that express the new-found power of the mind,
a power that in the first place resides in the mind's ability

to make language and thereby to make intelligible the random

flow of things.

At the risk of oversimplifying -- but not

—

we can also say that the other myths which

by very much

do not deal v;ith the creation of a humanly significant

world but with how things work out there after that creation,
are myths that express the power of the human body.

exactly, they express the power of the human bodies

More
:

physical,

social, and affective.
First, as Mrs. Langer has said, myth is:

Jung, Memories Dreams
Vintage Books, 1963), p 255.
G.

(N.Y.:

,

.•

,

and Reflections
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—

built on the most primitive symbol
the
body (just as most of our descriptive
language is based on the symbolism of head
and foot, leg and arm, mouth, neck, back,
etc.:
the "foothills" of a range, the
mountain's "shoulder," the "leg" of a triangle, the "bottleneck," the "headland,"
etc.).
This envisagement of the v;orld as
a realm of individual living forces, each
a being with desires and purposes that
bring it into conflict with other teleologically directed powers, is really the
key idea of all mythical interpretations:
the idea of the Spirit World.

The economy of creation is seen mythically as a system of

vital interplays similar to those within the human body.
On this level, myth is metaphor expressive of what it feels
like to be physical man.
On another level it is also metaphor expressive of

what it feels like to have a social body.
gods in The Iliad

,

The society of

for instance, is in fact indistinguish-

able in its form from the society of the man (men?) who

wrote The Iliad

.

Robert Graves has pointed out repeatedly

the connections between myths and the human body politic,
the marriages and divorces of particular gods corresponding

most curiously to the alliances and wars of particular
nations, etc.

Myths are sociology written on the skies.

Some people claim to trace in the voyages of Ulysses

metaphorized version of the voyage from
to the civilized high Greek way.

1

7

Langer, Form

,

p.

188.

a

a

barbaric existence
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And on still another level, embracing all the
others, myth is metaphor expressive of that inner
body,
the organic world of the feelings.

Once their genius had

invented Aphrodite, men could conjure up her image and

thenceforth objectify and understand the joys and caprices
of their own love.

Once genius invented Ares, men had

only to imagine him to see the terrible and thrilling aspects
of their own private and public aggressiveness.

Or,

in

their imaginations they had only to look at Gilgamesh chasing after the riddle of death to comprehend the dark over-

whelming feelings that possess many an individual and sometimes confuse v/hole cultures.
the emotions.

Myth is

a

system for naming

It expresses the way men in different times

and places have pictured to themselves what it feels like
to be alive in this particular world.

"Before man thinks

in terms of logical concepts, he holds his experiences by

means of clear, separate, mythical images."

Through myth,

man sets up images of himself, of his mind, of his body, of
his cosmic situation as it feels to him.

Sometimes, as in

Homer and St. John, those images reach such a degree of

completeness and inner consistency, and answer so much to
what many men feel, that they become absolutely authoritative.
Myth, according to Jerome Bruner:

^^Cassirer, ibid., p. 37.

.
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is at once an external reality and the
resonance of the internal vicissitudes
of man ... .Myth
insofar as it is fitting, provides a ready-made means of
externalizing human plight by embodying
and representing them in storied plot
,

and character.

Our experience of our own minds and of our own

bodies may not be identical to that of ancient man, but
we as much as he need ways to project and metaphorize it.
We need, if not myth exactly, something that will do the
same work for us it did for the fathers.
V7e

have been able only to suggest the immense range

of expressive metaphor
to cultural to mythic.

(E

>

M)

,

from purely personal

But hopefully it has been established

that metaphor is the major device by which emotional meanings are expressed and defined on all levels of experience.

We turn now to another work that metaphor does:

structuring of experience

(E

<

the pre-

M)

Contextual Metaphor

Understanding things is mostly

a

matter of seeing

them in a context, seeing them within some kind of pattern.

Something isolated, disconnected, without context, has no
meaning.

It will, though, provoke curiosity and prompt a

search for meaning, as discrepancies between the calculated

^^Jerome S. Bruner, On Knowing (N.Y.:
1969)

,

p.

31.

Atheneum,
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and the observed orbits of the planets once did.

with a maverick fact or event, the mind seeks

a

Confronted
context

within which the fact or event will make sense, lose its
isolation, fit the pattern.

The establishment of such a

context is one of the. works of metaphor.

One thing is seen

within the pattern of another, the characteristics of one
are transferred to the other.

Car manufacturers know this well.

They do not merely

present a new car to the public; they present it in

a

meta-

phoric context of their own choosing that will "define" the
car the way they want.
a

The car is pictured against a sunset,

lavish home, a romantic couple.

Even the car's name is

chosen with an eye to metaphoric context.
after

a

Mustang)

The car is named

powerful and graceful animal (Cougar, Impala, Wildcat,
,

or after an almost mythical pleasure spot (Monterey,

Montego, even El Dorado)

,

or,

increasingly nowadays, after

something small, charming, harmless (Cricket, Pinto, Gremlin).

Both the background and the name are metaphors that supply

a

context and therefore a considerable freight of meaning to
something that is, otherv/ise, just an out-priced piece of

moderately well made machinery.
By metaphors we define the things we see, or rather,

define how we shall see them.

For example, athletics is a

major source of the metaphors that help many people define
situations they find themselves in.
i-.:'^

We speak of the market-

game, of the mating game, of "playing to win," of keeping
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an eye on the ball, of being resigned to reversals
because
it s all part of the game," of making ball— park
estimates,

etc.

Seeing business dealings, marriage, etc., metaphorically

in terms of athletics puts them into the context of struc-

tured competitions, of controlled tensions, of victories

hoped for and defeats feared

—

and, too, of ultimate illu-

sion and indifference because, after all, it's "only

a game."

The contextual metaphor defines how we see what we see.
It is readily evident that contextual metaphor is

related to expressive, in that it too is often

based on feelings.

—

always?

—

But its purpose is not so much to define

what one feels as what and how one sees.

We can distinguish

both functions in the following example.

If

I

meet

a

man

and feel he is little more than an inert. and useless mass,
I

will express my feeling by calling him metaphorically

"a clod."

But immediately the metaphor that has expressed

my emotion also begins to control the way

everything about the man.

I

understand

Not only are my feelings defined

by the metaphor, so is the man.

If I have defined this man

as a clod and then hold too tightly to that metaphor,

I

may continue to express the reality of my feelings accurately
enough, but
of the man.

am no longer accurately defining the reality

I
I

am defining, however, how

I

see him.

The meta-

phor is doing two distinct works here, one to express emotion,
the other to define context.
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Once it is there, an expressive metaphor
tends

almost at once to become a contextual metaphor.
a

person or a culture has structured experience

The way
(E

>

m)

in the past is also extremely likely to be
the way that

person or culture is pre-structuring it
future.

(E

<

m)

for the

Indeed, it is the very function of contextual

metaphor to set up what one's experience of something
will
be, even before he has experienced it,

and even regardless

of whether this way of setting it up should turn out to
be

profitable in action or not.

Contextual metaphors tend to

be established more or less automatically, not as the result
of a conscious decision,

thought.

still less after a great deal of

Still, because of their influence on what people

will experience and do they are obviously of such extraor-

dinary importance they should not be left to chance.
The economist Dr. Kenneth Boulding describes the

impact of unconsciously accepted contextual metaphors in
the field of political life;

These symbolic images are of great importance in political life, and especially in
international relations. We think of the
United States, for instance, as Uncle Sam;
of England as John Bull; or of Russia as a
performing bear. These symbolic images are
particularly important in the summation
and presentation of value images. Value
images do not usually consist of a long and
detailed list of alternatives in a carefully compiled rank-order. They consist,
rather, of a "posture" which in a sense
summarizes an extremely complex network
of alternatives and situations.
In
.
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Christianity, for instance, the symbol of
the Crucifix or of tne Virgin has exercised
an enormous evocative power through the cen~
turies because of the way in which these
symbols summarize a whole value system, a
whole attitude toward life and the universe.
Political images do the same thing at a
^iffsrent level. The creators of these
symbolic images exercise quite extraordinary
power over the imaginations of men and the
course of events.
Consider, for example,
the pov;er of the image of the political
party in the United States. The Republican
Party is conceived as an elephant, rather
old, rather dignified, a little slow, not
perhaps terribly bright, but with a good
deal of wisdom, hard working, full of
integrity, rather conservative, a little
isolated from the world around him, patient,
thick-skinned, but capable of occasional
inarticulate squeals of rage. The Democratic Party is thought of as a donkey,
active, agile, clever, a little unsure of
himself, a bit of an upstart, quick, sensitive, a little vulgar, and cheerfully
absurd.
These images are reiterated by
cartoons and have been of great importance
in establishing the political climate.
In international relations, the symbolic
image of the nation is of extraordinary
importance.
Indeed, it can be argued that
it has developed to the point where it has
become seriously pathological in its extreme
form.
The national symbol becomes the object
of a kind of totem-worship.
Cartoons and
political speeches continually reinforce the
image of roles of nations as "real" personalities lions, bears, and eagles, loving,
hating, embracing, rejecting, quarreling,
fighting.
By these symbols, the web of
conflict is visualized not as a shifting,
evanescent, unstable network of fine individual threads but as a simple tug-of-war
between large opposing elements. This
symbolic image is one of the major causes
of international warfare and is the principal threat to the survival of our present world ^ ^

—

.

2<^Kenneth Boulding, The Image
Michigan Press, 1969), p. 110.

(University of

.
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Not only does collective emotion find images through

which to express and define itself, but also those images,
once set up, condition and even control the available range
of any further collective emotion.

We are limited not so

much in our feelings themselves as in the images that expresscontrol them.

We first set up images of what reality has

felt like to us, and then we make sure that reality will

imitate those images.

What starts off as expressive metaphor

becomes a contextual one.
Oscar Wilde said it did.

Nature does imitate art, just as
Or,

as Dr. Kaufmann has put it with

more elaboration and less wit:

Culturally determined metaphors ... act as
a means of self -definition for individuals
and groups; they establish useful equations
betv^een crucial moral abstractions and
available visual experience ... .The most
profound social creativity consists in the
invention of new, radical metaphors; it
also and more often consists of adapting
old metaphors to the current energies of a
culture 2 ^
.

Potentially the most important -- because the most

positive

—

of all the contextual metaphors that impinge on

us from our culture are the arts.

They are far more stable,

more carefully structured, more responsibly conceived than
the frequently jingoistic metaphors supplied by politics.

Art insofar as it structures and clarifies feelings is ex-

pressive metaphor par excellence

.

And art, insofar as it makes

up the cultural tradition of how to structure emotion, is

contextual metaphor par excellence
J.

As Mrs. Danger has said:

Kaufmann, ibid., p. 46.

.
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...art penetrates deep into personal
because in giving form to the world, it life
articulates human nature:
sensibility, energy
passion, and mortality. More than anything
else in experience, the arts mold our
actual
ife of feeling.
This creative influence is
a more important relation between
art and
contemporary life than the fact that motifs
are derived from the artist's environment.
Surely, art is rooted in experience; but
experience, in turn, is built up in memory
and preformed in imagination according to
the intuitions of powerful artists, often
long dead (it takes time for an influence
to reach the deepest strata of mentality,
and what we learn in childhood, never to
lose again, always stems from an earlier
age)
more rarely prophets in our own
generation
Artistic training is, therefore, the education of feeling, as our usual schooling
in factual subjects, and logical skills such
as mathematical "figuring" or simple argumentation (principles are hardly ever explained)
is the education of thought.
Few
people realize that the real education of
emotion is not the "conditioning" effected
by social approval and disapproval, but the
tacit, personal, illuminating contact with
symbols of feeling. Art education, therefore,
is neglected, left to chance, or regarded as
a cultural veneer.
People who are so concerned
for their children's scientific enlightenment
that they keep Grimm out of the library and
Santa Claus out of the chimney, allow the
cheapest art, the worst of bad singing, the
most revolting sentimental fiction to impinge
on the children's minds all day and every day,
from infancy.
If the rank and file of youth
grows up in emotional cowardice and confusion,
sociologists look to economic conditions or
family relations for the cause of this deplorable
"human weakness," but not to the ubiquitous
influence of corrupt art, which steeps the average
mind in a shallow sentimentalism that ruins what
germs of true feeling might have developed in it.
Only an occasional devotee of the arts sees the
havoc, as for instance Percy Buck, who remarked,
nearly thirty years ago:
,

,
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"There seems to be complete indifference,
at all events in England
.whether the
emotional side of a man is developed in any
way at all. The one and only conviction an
Englishman has about emotion is that you
should learn, as early as possible, to suppress it entirely."
"...what exercise should be to the physical
side of our lives, religion to our moral, and
learning to our intellectual side, this can
art be, and nothing else but art, to our emotional side."^^
.

We can see, too, the impact of contextual metaphor on
the development of science.

During the medieval centuries

when things were seen in a purely religious

v/ay,

the world

was considered to have no abiding reality of its own, hence
only a passing interest on its own.

It was mostly a sacra-

mental universe, a suggestion and adumbration of the higher
world.

The natural cosmos was a metaphor expressive of God's

glory and power.

Man and his society were the rough natural

materials from v^hich was made the Church, which was
phor or sacrament of Christ.

sacrament of God.
a book,

And Christ was

a

a

meta-

metaphor or

The Scriptures were a book, and Nature

and they were both books about God.

v;as

The only thing

that was "really real" in this metaphoric universe was of course
God himself.

He alone was not a metaphor.

It is a magnificent

conception, that opened up some intellectual possibilities and

closed off others.
architecture.

It inspired exquisite poetry, music,

It laid down the broad lines of society and

^^Langer, Form

,

p.

401.
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explained the purposes of history and of
individual life.
But at the same time, it was impossible
in such a world
for science to develop.
Science can develop

only if this

present world is worth looking at for its
own sake, and if
it can be understood without reference
to metaphors that
transcend it in content and scope.

The emergence of science

requires seeing the world in a different metaphoric
context
than that of the Middle Ages.
J.

H.

Randall23 traces the development of modern

science against the background of the West's shifting
myths
and metaphors, although he does not use those particular
terms.

In his analysis, the Renaissance changed the medieval

^^ythology only to the extent that it made the universe and

everything in it metaphoric of man instead of metaphoric of
God.

All things were humanized.

But even so, the world was

still largely understood as metaphoric of something other

than itself.

Randall concludes that in this sense the

Renaissance, far from being the beginning of the modern world,
was really the last phase of the medieval one.
In the 17th and 18th Centuries, however, such romantic

metaphors collapsed altogether among most learned men.

Men

no longer looked at the world in order to see the fabulous

Something Else beyond it, but to see the universe itself.
Instead of being a metaphor,

the-

world became something to be

Randall, The Making of the Modern Mind
(Cambridge, Mass.:
Riverside Press, n.d.).
H.
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understood through a metaphor.

The mind of the age being

clock crazy, people more or less naturally
began to see
the universe as a huge clock.

They set up

new contextual

a

metaphor, that defined the world in terms of the
mechanics
of movement.

And therein lay the beginning of what we would

be willing to call science.

Science did not begin with the

collapse of metaphor, but with the collapse of certain kinds
of metaphors that were inimical to it and with the creation
of new metaphors that favored it.

The process of scientific development against shifting

metaphors does not stop there, however.

As Randall points out,

the clock metaphor was ideal for the emerging physical sciences
of the 17th and 18th Centuries.

But it was deadly for the

social and psychological sciences that were also having their

difficult birth at that time.
tion in the 19th Century

v;as

Not until the theory of evoluthe model for scientific explana-

tion of phenomena changed from

a

mechanical one to a biological

one, thereby rendering the mechanical model insufficient as

the sole determining metaphor of all science.

Such is the determining power of contextual metaphor

over the further development of thought, its power to focus
the mind on the world in a particular way.

We wish to extend

Randall's analysis farther than he himself does, however.

Psychiatry in its modern version was born in the late 19th
Century, when the underlying metaphor of the physical sciences
;,

-ALinued to be that of the machine, and of the non-physical
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sciences that of the evolving biological
organism.

Now,

one of the sciences that deal with living
organisms is that
of medicine.
The nascent science of psychiatry based
itself
on a medical model; it understood mental problems
as being

essentially the same as biological ones, with the
consequence
that "patients" were understood as "sick" and in need
of
"doctor" and of his "treatments."

a

Psychiatry, like medicine,

was to be a science of the pathologies of organisms.

The

contextual metaphor involved here is obviously very powerful
and creative; at the least, it takes mental problems out of
the realm of ethics and morals where they had festered for
so long.

But it

and limiting.

^

a

metaphor, and hence is both helpful

Just as the social sciences were originally

both inspired and crippled by the prevailing metaphor of
the clock, so psychiatry was both inspired and crippled by the

metaphor of disease.

In our own day efforts are being made

to change the contextual metaphor,

to stop viewing psychiatry

as an extension of biological medicine.

From the examples we have given, it should be clear
that the most creative moment in the process of thinking about

anything is the moment in which one sets up the basic contextual

metaphors within which he will do any further thinking on the
subject.

Creativity in any field is essentially the capacity

to view an old thing in a new way, and contextual metaphor is

the tool through which the definition of viewpoint is accomplished.
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But contextual metaphors, once established,
have a
way of lasting longer than their usefulness
and of being
applied rigidly even when they are inappropriate.
Viewing
a man exclusively and rigidly as "a clod"
is, after a point,
no longer to look at the man at all.
it is to look only at
the metaphor itself and to substitute it for the
reality.

When the metaphor is no longer taken as the way one
sees,
but as the thing one sees

—

when, that is, it is no longer

considered to be a metaphor at all

—

it becomes a tyrant

structure that makes impossible any new approaches to experience.

It is then the ectcskeleton of thought, an armor
the outside world and the prison of the inner one.

We have been speaking of the role of contextual meta-

phor in rather grand things such as politics, art, and science.

But there is another, more daily, more immediately practical
use for it which we will consider now.

It is the role of

contextual metaphor in problem-solving and decision-making.
We know that many specific problems have been moved

toward solution by someone's pausing to notice that "this"
is very much like "that," and that if

light of "that"

I

I

take "this" in the

might get a better grasp of it.

The man

who has never mixed cement before but whose hobby is cooking

might transfer metaphorically what he knows about mixing flour
to cement.

The man who knows mathematics can, if he chooses

to make the jump,

find he already knows a great deal about

music; for, although music is not mathematics nor

a

branch of

Ill

still it can be taken "as though" it were.

it,

Or, again,

the man who knows the feel of angling for a fish might
call
on the same feeling when he plays a game of cards or
does

business.

Or again, Rutherford solved the problem of how

to explain the atomic. particles of matter by arguing by

analogy from the structure of the solar system.

In each

case the solution to a particular problem has been achieved
t>y

the conscious or unconscious use of metaphor.

The process of solving problems creatively is essen-

tially a matter of making one's experience in one area work
for him in another.

It is a matter of selecting something

from one's past knowledge and experience that

v;ill

serve as

the context that defines how one will view a present problem.

The problem-within-problems is this matter of establishing

metaphorical context.

Confronted

v/ith a

tendency is to react in a double way.

new problem, one's

On the one hand, one

is fearful of the problem as being something unprecedented

in his experience, outside the boundaries of what he knows.

This feeling of newness can excite either

a

sense of challenge

among the courageous, or a sense of automatic defeat among
the timid.

On the other hand, one equally feels when faced

with a new problem that his store of previous experience ought
to help him somehow at this juncture, that there is an under-

lying unity somewhere hidden in the diversities of the past
that ought to stand him in good stead now.
f.

eling of disjunction, on the other

a

On the one hand

feeling almost of unity.
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This, indeed, is the felt basis of the
ancient

philosophical problem of the One and the Many.

The Greeks

sometimes felt there was only the Many, the
plurality of
things, the overwhelming disunity of impressions
and experiences, the uniqueness of each event and of each
individual
being, the confusion of categories, the defeat
of ideas.

But they sometimes also felt those million disjunctions
give

way to more and more ultimate unity, to the equally over-

whelming conjunction of all things in one final essence,
that perfection beyond all the smaller harmonies:

the One.

They tried to resolve the paradox by philosophy, but succeeded
only in stating a conundrum which philosophy has yet to resolve.
We need not for our present purposes get lost in the

philosophies of the puzzle, but we must take note of the
experience upon which they are based and which they try to
explain.

For everyone has to live out a practical ansv/er to

the problem.

We cannot live with either extreme of the problem,

either with the undifferentiated One or with the disjoined Many.
Yet both are present in our experience every day, and constitute
the arch-problem within all our particular problems.

The

question, then, is how to make workable sense out of the paradox.
We are often told that, when confronted with a problem,

we must clear our heads, cool our emotions, stop all daydreams,

become logical.

But there are two main inadequacies of

purely logical approach to thinking out problems.

a

The first
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is that, whil 0 logic classifies things within an ascending

series of abstract categories, it does not classify them
in terms directly of each other.

sort of order that is concrete.
hov7

It does not achieve any

It does not help us see

one thing resembles another in function or structure,

but only how two things share some purely conceptual attribute.

Things connected in this way remain in fact mostly

disconnected, and the process of logical abstraction which

may seem at first sight to solve the One-and-Many problem
in reality leaves it pretty much untouched.

It gets us

farther into logic, but no deeper into experience.

It is

not from logic that the answers to real problems come.

But even more to the point here, such

a

system of

logical classification, if used too exclusively, makes the

mind static and rigid, hence incapable of creative solutions
to its problems.

Because logic does not hold things up to

each other so much as to "higher" abstractions, it allows
one little or no free flow of associations, none of the

genuinely new insights that come from being generous with
the reins of thought.

If poets were to follow abstract hier-

archies of classification, Bobby Burns would have paid scant

attention to his famous mouse, Shakespeare would never have
seen Time's scythe mowing away the years of love, and Wordsworth

remembering childhood would have had no intimations of immortality.

And by exactly the same token, neither would Bell have

thought his way from the workings of the ear to the invention
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of the telephone, nor Hobbes from an impression
of the

awesome mass and power of a whale to a theory of the

modern state.

And no child

V70 uld

plsy in the leaping of a frog.

room for transcendenc.e of logic.
the Many

—

have found

a

game to

Too much logic leaves no

Worse, the Many remains

now no longer as the multiplicity of unrelated

beings, but as the multiplicity of unrelated concepts.

However the problem of the One and the Many may be

answered in philosophy or logic, it is answered for the
concrete, problem-solving mind by the making of metaphors.

Metaphor is a way of getting some practical work done.

If

it has grasped one thing, the mind has by that fact already

grasped another thing that shares the configuration.

This

is sometimes called the "lateral transfer" of knowledge.

It is a horizontal shifting of what a man already knows in

one area into another area he had thought he did not understand,

only to find that he does understand it.

The efficiency of

that kind of operation is obvious, for it makes single knov;ledge
do double work.

The job of contextual metaphor is to put

equals, signs between the gestalt of one thing and that of another.

Thus, the contribution of contextual metaphor to the practical

solution of the problem of the One and the Many is that it lets
everything remain its

ov;n

unique self, while recognizing that

in their patterns things repeat each other and form unity.
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A metaphoric identity between one thing and
another
is established because it is useful, and it
vanishes as
soon as it is no longer needed.
and ephemeral.

Of itself it is provisional

It is a temporary classification.

bridge from one thing to another.

It is the

After one has crossed the

t>ridge he no longer needs it at all.

Once he had thought

up the telephone, Bell did not have to fantasize any longer

about ears.
In short, the day-in-day-out solutions of specific

problems, if they are to be creative, depend on our capacity
to see the configuration of the problem, and to draw on what

we already know about the similar configuration of some other,

apparently unrelated bit of our experience and knowledge in
another area.

It depends on making contextual metaphors.

They are the instruments of practical understanding.
It is by the making of comparisons, connections.

Expressive Metaphors

,

that the mind structures for itself

what its experience of reality has been:
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It is also by the making of comparisons, connections.

Contextual Metaphors

,

that the mind pre-structures for itself

what its on-going experience of reality will be:
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It is also by means of metaphor that individuals

and groups, and even the various dimensions of a single

personality, communicate to each other their understanding
of reality:

These are the basic uses of metaphor.
We turn now to the practical question:

If making

metaphor is so basic a process, how does one become
of it?

a

master

^

CHAPTER

I

V

THE SCHOOLS
One way of estimating the damage done by the educa-

tional institution is to view it metaphorically as the owner
and trainer of pet dogs.

Even at that job, it is, apparently,

a failure:

...if an animal is deprived of its natural
environment and society, sensorily deprived,
made mildly anxious, and restricted to the
narrowest possible spontaneous motion, it will
emotionally identify with its oppressor and
respond v/ith lov7-grade grace, energy, and
intelligence in the only way allowed to it.
The poor beast m.ust do something, just to
live on a little.
There is no doubt that a
beagle can be trained to walk on its hind legs
and balance a ball on the tip of its nose.
But the dog will show much more intelligence,
force, and speedy feedback when chasing a
rabbit in the field.
It is an odd thought
that we can increase the efficiency of learning by nullifying a priori most of an animal's
powers to learn and taking it out of its best
field

—

—

.

But there is a criticism of education that goes farther

than that.
phors.

It is more discriminating in its choice of meta-

It rejects the idea of

student-as-cat

.

s

tudent-as-dog in favor of

Education, then, is the unnatural power that

makes dogs out of cats:

Books,

^Paul Goodman, Compulsory Mis -education (N.Y.:
1964), p. 88.

Vintage

^

^
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The tragedy of man is that, like the dog, his
character can be molded. You cannot mold the
character of a cat, an animal superior to the
dog.
You can give a dog a bad conscience, but
you cannot give a conscience to a cat. Yet
most people prefer dogs because their obedience
and their flattering tail-wagging afford visible
proof of the master's superiority and worth.

But there is a criticism that goes still farther.

rejects the animal metaphors altogether.

The kind of narrow-

ness and rigidity of viev/point that animals
cats

—

It

—

both dogs and

need for their survival, is harmful to man.

From

this viewpoint, education is seen as the unnatural force that

makes constricted little animals out of men who would be supple

Categorical and dogmatic thinking are more
suitable to cats and dogs than to human
beings
.

These three statements, each by a man eminently influential in the field of education, vary in the sharpness of
their metaphors, but they all circle around a central idea:

Education is unnatural and denaturing.

That in essence is

.

the main accusation levelled at the institution especially

for these last ten years or so.

It was Dewey's objection

years ago as well, but to many people now he seems to be more
a

patron saint of the present invested system than

critic of it.

1960)

,

^A. S.
p. 100.

mighty

a

Dewey's reform somehow got deflected, and his

Neill, Summerhill

(N.Y.:

Hart Publishing Co.,

^Korzybsky, quoted by Neil Postman and Charles
Dell
V7eingartner Teaching as a Subversive Activity (N.Y.
105.
Publishing Company), p.
:

,

.
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liberating and richly romantic ideas about children
and about
learning became the slogans under which a more and
more hardened,

a less and less

responsive system developed.

The slogan

was Learn by Doing, but the reality was Memorize What
Other

People Do.

The slogan was Child-Centered Education, but the

reality was Education-Centered Children.
The huge amount of criticism aimed at contemporary

education comes out of a widely held and increasingly clear

view of the mind as being essentially NOT

a

computer, that is,

not merely a storage system for isolated facts, and not merely
a syllogizer.
a

So far so good.

But the critics, who cherish

more supple and subtle view of the mind, seem more able to

lambaste the actual procedures of education than to come up

with workable alternatives.

Prophets without plans have arisen

on all sides to denounce a system that does not make sense.
We will look at what some of the prophets say, and after that

we will make our
it.

In essence,

ov/n

suggestion about what can be done about

they say education is too rigid, rationalistic,

moralistic, institutionalized, officialized
scious

.

^

—

in a word,

con -

They opt for, but generally do not show us how to

get to, an education more fluid, imaginative, liberating, subjective, individualized

—

in a word, preconscious

We agree

^In the meaning of the word discussed above, p. 18

.
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with that ambition, and propose that the practical means
to that end will be found v;hen education begins to
help

people in the making of metaphor.
But first, the critics.
A.

Prophets Without Plans

I:

The Elegists

In a moment of outrageous enthusiasm, Edgar Fried-

enberg, who should and does know better, wrote of John

Holt's How Children Fail as being "in a class with Piaget...

Many of his accounts in fact might be excerpts from
by Pinter or Albee."

a

play

None of that says anything about Piaget,

Pinter, or Albee, and precious little about Holt

—

except

that he touched

a

Holt inspired

crowd of imitators (Herbert Kohl and James

a

nerve in Edgar Friedenberg.

Herndon, among others)

The fact that

suggests that when he touched that

nerve he touched it dead center,. and in more people than
just Dr. Friedenberg.
His complaint, like Kohl's and Herndon's, is simple

enough.

The schools are set up in such

contradict the children who go to them.

a

way that they

These spontaneous,

investigatory, imaginative little learners become gradually
m.ore

tense, anxious, guilt-ridden, fearful, frustrated, dis-

couraged, failure-prone.

This list of adjectives has achieved

an almost ritual status in the contemporary literature of com-

plaints.

When the complaints are aimdd at pedagogical methods

.

^
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alone, they amount to a plea for a problem-centered
approach,

rather than an answer-centered approach.
not stop there.

But they usually do

Throughout the writings of the Holts, Kohls,

and Herndons there is implied, and often stated, the
great

Romantic Thesis:

Back to Nature.

The alternative -- l can see no other -is to have schools and classrooms in which
each child in his own way can satisfy his
curiosity, develop his abilities and talents,
pursue his interests, and from the adults
and other children around him get a glimpse
of the great variety and richness of life.
In short, the school should be a great
smorgasbord of intellectual, artistic, creative,
and athletic activities, from which each child
could take whatever he wanted, and as much as
he wanted, or as little.

Almost essential to the Romantic Thesis is

a

kind of

incantatory despair, for there seems to be no way to escape
from the clav;s of the great enemy. Repressive Civilization.

What to do? You can read suggestions for
change in a lot of recent books by serious
and intelligent men.
I suppose I could add mine.
But frankly, I have almost no hope that there
will be any significant change in the way we
educate our children -- for that, after all,
v;ould involve liberty, the last thing we may
soon expect -- and so I have thought merely
to describe one time for you, parents, kids,
readers, the way it is.^

^John Holt, How Children Fail
ing Company/ 1964), p. 180
^ James Herndon,
The Way It
Bantam Books, Inc., 1969Y~, ^pT 19^7

(N.Y.:

S pozed

Dell Publish-

To Be

(N.Y.:

;
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We are left with the teacher-as-pelican
,

puncturing

his own breast in a splendidly inartyrial disregard of self,
to feed his young.

When I think of my work as a teacher one of the
children's favorite myths, that of Sisyphus,
continually comes to mind: the man condemned to
roll a rock up a mountain only to see it fall
back to the bottom, to return to the bottom
himself and take up his unending task. Without
hope and without cynicism, I try to make myself
available to my pupils.
I believe neither that
they will succeed nor that they will fail.
I
know they will fight, falter, and rise again
and again, and that if I have the strength I
will be there to rejoice and cry with them, and
to add my little weight to easing the burden of
being alive in the United States today.
There is much story-telling in the books of these men

—

mostly atrocity tales about the school system, and elegies
about their own inspired-but-doomed efforts to operate within
and against it.

They describe various of their projects with

the children, and many of them are truly inspiring examples
of sensitive and humane teaching.

Indeed, many of these proj-

ects are designed to evoke associative thinking in the children,
to encourage them to make their own connections and achieve

their own syntheses.

In virtually all but name, this is edu-

cation by metaphor and for metaphor.

The trouble v;ith it seems

to have been that the teachers who tried it v/ere more successful

at removing external and artificial constraints on the children's

minds than at thoroughly activating and carefully disciplining

^Herbert Kohl,
Library, 1968), p. 224.

^ C hildren

(N.Y.

The

Nev/

American
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the preconscious activities of those minds once
liberated.

The attempt to do that is certainly there, but the method,
the key, is not.

At best, it is there in a first and re-

mote approximation.
The System.

But that is apparently not enough for

The System can only see it as foolish experi-

mentation, idle play, dangerous liberalism.

Perhaps The

System does not really disagree with what these teachers
and authors are trying to do

—

perhaps it does not know

what they are trying to do, and suspects that they may
not either.

Either way, the light, such as it is, gets put

out almost as soon as it is lit.

And so, from these and

other popular romantic critics of education we get

a vivid,

tragic sense of schools as prisons, students as jailbirds;

students as raw materials, schools as factories; schools
as molds,

children as plastics

—

in other words, of schools

as systematic violators of the people they are supposed to

be serving.

But in the end that is all we get:

a sense of the

tragedy, a mood of despond, and, in the case of Kohl especially, a confession of the inevitability of it all.

B

Prophets Without Plans II:

.

The Medievalists

Adolescents often behave much like members
of an old-fashioned aristocracy ... (but modern
life is hostile to the aristocratic social
principle®...! have described my heuristic
)

1

®Edgar Z. Friedenberg, The V anishing Adolescent (N.Y.
Publishing Company, 1969), p. 29.

.

.
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model of an adolescent as a knight in shining
Chino pants... I have encountered a goodly few
such errant defenders of the faith. ^ They...
(are) a fierce and warlike people,
.accustomed
to more open country ° ... the traditions of a civil
service (—teaching) are not those of chivalry;
they do not emphasize courage feeling imagination, breadth of vision, and independence of
action
.

.

^

,

The medieval professions and specialties were
structured in an ideal world that allowed for
communication, that was international, and in
which in an important sense the professions
were oddly spontaneous and free. Our learning is increasingly departmentalized and prescribed.^^
In the medieval university, the
whole point of the gruelling trial of the
candidate was whether or not to accept him as
a peer... It was not to make comparative evaluations.
It was not to weed out and select
for an extra-mural licensor or employer ... the
medievals thought they knew what a good job
of v7ork was and... we are competitive because
we do not knov/.^^

—

—

Friedenberg and Goodman, two of the weightier critics
of contemporary education, ma]ce substantially the same points
as the others:

that the schools are geared for uniformity,

serve their own administrative convenience, and manipulate or

seduce their students into bored cooperation at the expense
of vital questioning and conflict.

These two eloquent men tend,

however, to frame their objections in an especially alluring way.

^

^

^

^

^

Ibid

.

,

p.

31.

ibid

.

,

p

112

.

^Goodman, ibid
^

Ibid

.

,

p

.

128

.

,

p.

123.

125
Foir

always, at tha fringas of vision, alludad to constantly

aithar by diract rafaranca or by subtla choica of words,
is tha prasumad Goldan Aga,

that madiaval momant whan tha

schools wara fraa, whan knighthood was in flower, when
society knew what it was all about.

But it is meaningless

to pit the poetry of the Middle Ages against the steel and

cement technology of our own, or their simple world view

against our more fractured

—

and infinitely richer

—

one.

We are not the Middle Ages, and very few among us want to
be.

And Edgar Friedenberg ought to be more careful than to

define the adolescent by a metaphor from that now done age,
for we know the name of the knight who lives outside of his

own proper time:

Don Quixote.

Goodman makes one of the clearest and shortest state-

ments of a truly free education:
This theory counsels learning by doing,
entirely rejects competition and grading,
There
and encourages fantasy and guesswork.
is no point, it claims, in learning the
"ansv7ers," for very soon there will be different answers .... In short, the theory is
Deweyan progressive education.

Friedenberg, of course, envisions the same thing.

But neither

man seems to think there are workable ways to achieve such an
ideal.

The ideal, like the Cathedral of Chartres, belongs to

^

^Ibid

•

/

p.

44.
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the Age and to the Realm of Poetry, and we to the
age when

reading a newspaper is an act of high literacy.
Goodman tends to that final form of pessimism:

Consequently
anarchy.

And

Friedenberg, in the same moment that he stops to admire the
sturdy independence, the "shaggy arrogance," of the modern
adolescent, notices also that, with a universal assist from
the schools, he is Vanishing
C.

.

Prophets Without Plans III:

The Elitists

And so, as always in affairs of the pendulum, we are

brought by the combined forces of gravity and inertia to the
other position.

Jacques Barzun, speaking brilliantly out of

the elitist tradition of French schools, joins forces with

Banesh Hoffmann against the falsely democratized, homogenized,
standardized Araerican school system.

The great lone enemy

here -- and properly so -- is named in Hoffmann's title, The

Tyranny of Testing

.

The Test stands for everything the schools

do against the creativity and integrity of superior students:

•

The tests deny the creative person a significant opportunity to demonstrate his creativity,
and favor the shrewd and facile candidate over
the one v/ho has something of his own to say.
Unlike essay examinations, they are mainly concerned with predetermined intellectual snippets...
They penalize the candidate who perceives subtle
points unnoticed by less able people, including
the test-makers...
They take account only of the choice of answer
and not of the quality of thought that led to
the choice ...

s

.
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They have

a

pernicious effect on education and

the recognition of merit.

Hoffmann's argument is intelligent, harsh,
narrow,
academic, and right.
Here, we are against the standardized
tests, not because they are tests

(cf.

the Holt-Kohl-Herndon-

Goodman-Friedenberg thesis), but because they are "unlike
essay
examinations"!
They are the wrong kind of test. We are
against them, then, because they work against "the best
students,

who presumably would fare better in an open-ended

examination.

The Hof fmann-Barzun preoccupation with the fate

the three percent amounts to a cause

,

and a very traditionally

and narrowly defined one at that.
...the tests... do not give the candidate a
significant opportunity to express himself.
If he is subtle in his choice of answers it
will go against him... If he is strong-minded,
non-conformist, unusual, original, or creative
--as so many of the truly important people are
he must stifle his impulses and conform as
best he can.
.the profound student can hardly
escape a feeling of contempt contemipt tinged
with dismay that these (unimaginative testwriters) have acquired the pov/er to judge him.
.

.

—

The sweet smell of aristocracy is in the air.

^

^

But as

soon as we have sniffed it, the memory shoots back of Friedenberg'

old-fashioned aristocrats, against whom modern society bears
so hostile a forehead.

The elitist argument falls within the

^^Banesh Hoffman, The Tyranny of Testing (London:
Collier-MacMi llan Ltd., 1962), p. 150.
^

^Ibid.

,

p.

91
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s

airiG

toirins

as

ths anarchist revolutionary's, and the dernocrat's:

that there is a Tyranny abroad, that it is

iirunensely endowed,

and that it suppresses night and day "the subtle, probing,

critical, or creative mind."

But both Barzun and Holt, both

Hoffman and Goodman, implicitly agree at the last frontier of
argument that the enemy is not each other.

For finally they

are all incurable romantics, believers in human possibilities,

defenders of the maverick, heretics within the system, optimists aJoout what people can do if not falsely constrained
and speciously judged.

Hoffmann exposes the circular reasoning of the testing
technocrats.

These people set up their "scientific" tests

because the evaluations and grades given at school are too
informal, too arbitrary.

They then evaluate those very

tests according to whether the results correspond statisti-

cally to the grades actually given by the teachers in the

schools

I

This cosmic silliness is a booming business in the

USA.

Hoffmann's argument against testing is an argument
against pasturized evaluations of what individual students
can or cannot do.

It is a plea for the return of "arbitrar-

iness," that is, of subjectivity, to the school world.

What

he calls "the flight from subjectivity" in education has its

bleakest result in the national testing industry, but that
romantics
is only a part of the same system to which the liberal
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also object, and object to for the same reasons:
is the enemy of the natural mind.

stepped.

gies

—

that it

That mind is not lock-

It is free, operates on hunches, makes up
analois a preconscious as it is conscious.

The times are -such that all the threads of signifi-

cant criticism weave together one cloth.
They are also such that the criticism itself deepens
the despair, for the core of the argument seems always to be

that we are faced with an entrenched, repressive, powerful,

wealthy System -- against which, what can one man do?

Thus,

everyone seems to frame the problem in one or other metaphor
of defeat,

so that,

like Richard II, we can only "sit upon

the ground and tell sad stories."

D.

Toward A Plan
Perhaps the man least defeated by the homogenizing

school system has been, for these forty years and more,
Neill, founder of Summerhill.

A.

S.

Neill set up his own radically

different school -- an alternative that cannot be followed
very often because it requires so massive an outlay of energy,
and so granitic a conviction of the rightness of the enterprise.

Neill's approach has the same kind of elegant sim-

plicity that has forever fixed St. Francis in the

V'Jestern

imagination as, perhaps, the only one of us who was ever

:

,
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right:

"Where there is hatred, let me sow love;
where there
is injury, pardon."
The tactic is simple.
One finds what
to do by systematically reversing what everyone
else is

doing.

They are so abundantly and obviously wrong that

doing the opposite has to be right.

At first sight this

seems to be anarchic

—

called anarchists

but in fact it is completely, minutely

systematic.
uses.

both Neill and St. Francis have been

Here, for example, are lists of words Neill

In the left hand column are words that describe con-

ventional schools, in the right column words that describe
Summerhill
fear, hate
unhappiness
discipline
conscience
religious & moral
training
theory, concepts
authority
pessimism
conservatism

approval love
happiness
freedom
natural goodness
personality, character
,

play
democracy
freshness, enthusiasm

The point here is that Neill is as systematic as the

schools he so generously despises.
like one,

Though he sometimes talks

not a laissez - faire educator

.

His approach,

if we may express it in words we have used before, is to be

at least highly suspicious of the strict, clear, static, pre-

cise categories of the conscious mind; and to be entirely

against the murky, hidden, destructive forces of the repressed,

unconscious mind; and to be fully in favor of the supple.
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personal, free, creative metaphoric processes of the
preconscious mind.

Neill himself never uses exactly these

terms to describe his enterprise, perhaps for fear of making

too analytical a statement.

And yet there it is

:

he wants

to free up the preconscious mind.

Summerhill might be defined as a school in
which play is of the greatest importance.
I am not thinking of play in terms of athletic
fields and organized games; I am thinking of
play in terms of fantasy.
And he goes on to speak of theater, music, dancing, sports,
and games.

Neill is a new kind of systematist, who finds his
own system in the reversal of everyone else's, including those
of his own Summerhill children.

Three girls had raided the kitchen larder.
The meeting fined them their pocket money.
They raided the kitchen again that night and
the meeting fined them a movie.
They raided
it once more, and the meeting was graveled
what to do.
The chairman consulted me.
"Give
them tuppence reward each," I suggested.
man, you'll have the whole school
"I-Jhat?
VJhy
"You
raiding the kitchen if we do that."
Two
won't," I said; "Try it." He tried it.
And
take
the
money.
of the girls refused to
all three were heard to declare that they
would never raid the larder again. They
didn't -- for about two months.
,

Neill seems to be a genius at breaking up pre-set ways of
By reversing them, he shows how changeable

thinking and behaving.

^^Neill, ibid
^

^Ibid.

,

p

.

.

,

51.

p.

62.

.
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they are, hence how easy it is to explore alternative

structures
Nsill, of course, has been widely misunderstood by

both friend and foe as a destroyer of all structures.

His

key idea of self-regulation, "the right... to live freely,

without outside authority in things psychic and somatic"
(p.

105), is particularly easy to misconstrue:

Tommy, aged four, bangs the notes of a
neighbor's piano with a wooden mallet. His
fond parents look on with triumphant smile
which means, "Isn't self-regulation wonderful?"
...any idea, old or new, is dangerous, if not
combined with common sense... The whole freedom
movement is marred and despised because so
many advocates of freedom have not got their
feet on the ground.

Clearly, Neill has his own standards.

But he does not help

matters much by appealing to "common sense" or by telling

people to keep "their feet on the ground."

Just where we

would want him to be explicit and clear he becomes allusive,
content to indicate a general direction.
I'Jhile

much less radical than Neill, Sybil Marshall

nevertheless is a near cousin of his in her approach to children, and her methods have the advantage of being much more

clearly stated.

believe that we can see in her explicitly

I

described activities with children

^Ibid

lesser version of what

She is not the systematically anti-system

Neill must do.

^

a

.

,

p

.

10 6.

^
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genius that he is, but in describing concretely
what we
can call structured freedom she is much
more helpful.
She describes an early moment in her
development as
a teacher.
Notice that what is at work in her reflections

here is a powerful natural sense of metaphor.
...the teacher's f unction ... is to make each
child to realize that history is like a
coral reef, composed, it is true, of things
that are dead, but in itself still living
and growing; and to show him his own life
and those of his playmates and peers as the
polyps being woven by time into the topmost
patterns.
.My job v/as to create a taste for
history and to place before the children such
an array of tempting fare that they would
reach out and help themselves
.

.

.

^

So far, Mrs. Marshall is making the metaphors for herself,

but she is also beginning to provide her students with the

opportunity to make their own connections.
a

Her evolution as

teacher brought her much farther into metaphor.

She

gradually found that the way to proceed through a subject
was

"

symphonically

,

"

that is, by the natural flowing of one

thing into another, and by the orchestration of diverse elements.

There were to be no more artificial barriers between

one "subject" and another "subject."

If the students felt a

connection between one thing and another, then ipso facto that

connection existed and deserved to be explored.
Though all the work is in some way related
to (a central) theme, it is not tied to it

Sybil Marshall, 7m Experiment in Education (Camljridge
University Press, 1963)
p. 45.
,
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nor llinitea by it, as it is in the so-called
project inethod" nor does it employ one
group of instruments only, as in the "center
of interest" method.
My objection to both
those otherwise good ideas has been that the
various subjects have been made to fit into
the chosen theme, whether they would or not,
®ls6 neglected entirely because they were
too far away to be tied to it, however
clumsily.
The "symphonic method" allows for
second subjects, bridge passages, variations,
differences of tempo, and indeed wholly
separate movements; yet the term's work,
like a symphony, is only completely satisfactory as an entire whole.
;

Mrs. Marshall describes how the method worked for

one term.

She started the term with a reading of the pro-

logue to The Canterbury Tales

.

The children noticed, and

liked, some of Chaucher's imagery; Mrs. Marshall therefore

encouraged them to "collect" any metaphors they might notice
elsewhere.

She also conducted a few predictable lessons on

Chaucer and on Norman history for purposes of background.
This naturally le^d to a side-trip into the story of Thomas
a Becket.

The children wanted to see the characters in Chaucer's

Prologue, and so she suggested they make paper mosaics of them.

And Chaucer's references to music evoked interest in playing
old instruments and singing old songs.
So far so predictable, though much better than what

usually happens to children
thing interesting comes up.

^Oj.bid.

,

p.

172.

—

or to Chaucer.

But then some-

Mrs. Marshall suggests the children
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v;rite their own tales about six modern characters of their

own invention who would meet at the London Airport on a

foggy night.

The children become fascinated by the intrica-

cies of the airport, and of the flights into and out of it.

They even do some minor mathematical calculations to help

them figure out how the airport works.

Mrs. Marshall en-

courages the children to follow out any connection that seems
to make sense to them.

She supports them -- and no doubt

leads them too -- in their natural sense of metaplior.

Indeed,

what she calls "the symphonic method" could equally (and less
metaphorically) be called the metaphoric method.

Over several years of working with children Mrs.

Marshall came to

a

smaller version of

A.

S.

Neill's idea that

pre-made categories of thought, behavior, emotion and imagination, which then inevitably have to be enforced by external
autliority,

child.

are anti-educational.

Indeed, they are anti-

The only thing that makes complete educational sense

is to encourage children in their explorations of the meta-

phors they themselves have come up with.

If Mrs. Marshall

is to be faulted at all in her approach,

it is because she

draws the lines of acceptable metaphor too close.

Any meta-

phor leading into an art exercise she happily rewards, but
there is no mention in her book of anything that leads in
the direction of science, and little in the direction of

phvsical exploration of any sort.
f

r.

,ome

Nor are really adven-

metaphoric connections much encouraged, even within
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the arts -- she prefers to stay rather close
to home base.

Still, Mrs. Marshall has shown what A. S. Neill
only hinted
at,

and what all the others we have discussed despaired
to

find:

method of freeing up the preconscious mind -- with-

a

out burning dov/n the schools, and even without any lynchings.
E.

The State Then of the Question:
How To Ask a Question
,

,

.

Neil Postman and Charles Weingartner have condensed
the questions of educational reform down to two:

good learners do?

What does a good teacher do?

What do
Here is

what they say in answer:
.good learners have confidence in their
ability to learn... tend to enjoy solving
problems .... seem to know what is relevant
to their survival and what is not.
.prefer
to rely on their own judgment ... are usually
not fearful of being wrong.... are emphatically
not fast answerers .... are f lexible.
.have a
high degree of respect for facts (which they
understand are tentative) .... do not need to
have an absolute, final, irrevocable resolution
to every problem.
.

.

.

.

.

.

The teacher rarely tells students what he
thinks they ought to know... His basic mode
of discourse with students is questioning.
Generally, he does not accept a single stateHe enment as an answer to a ques tion
courages student-student interaction as
opposed to student- teacher interaction. And
generally he avoids acting as a mediator or
judge of the quality of ideas expressed. ... He
rarely summarizes the positions taken by students on the learnings that occur.... His
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

?

i
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lessons develop from the responses of
students
and not from a previously determined
"logical"
s tructure
He measures his success in terms
of behavioral changes in students
^
.

.

.

.

Nothing is said here about how learners or
teachers
develop such skills, nor is very much said about what
these
skills might look like in practice.

Still, we can see that

the really important issues in education are probably
easier

to deal with than the universal paranoia allows us to think.

The key is:

open learners, open teachers.

Postman and

Wsingartner approach being operational when they zero in
on the art of asking a question.

developed, perhaps all is well.

If that skill can be

The problem, and its so-

lution, are then easier than anybody had thought:

Will your questions increase the learner's
will as well as his capacity to learn?
Will they help to give him a sense of joy
in learning?
Will they help to provide- the learner with
confidence in his ability to learn?
In order to get answers, will the learner
be required to make inquiries?....
Does each question allow for alternative
answers
Will the process of answering the questions
tend to stress the uniqueness of the learner?
Would the questions produce different answers
if asked at different stages of the learner's
development?
Will the ansv/ers help the learner to sense
and understand the universals in the human
condition and so enhance his ability to draw
closer to other people?^^
.

.

.

^^Postman and Weingartner, ibid
2

^Ibid.

,

p

.

66

.

.

,

31 ff.

I

138

One senses

one is absolutely sure

describes the kinds of questions

A.

—

that that

Neill and Sybil

S.

Marshall ask their little people, the kind that Freidenberg
and Goodman would approve of with enthusiasm, the kind

Hoffmann and Barzun are after, the kind that would put Holt,
Kohl, Herndon, and all the other despairing teachers back
in business again,

and, for good measure, the kind that

would revolutionize education without anyone's having to
buy a single non-revolutionary "revolutionary" gadget or
gimmick.

For questions of this sort are designed, not to

provoke recall of a right question, but to evoke the use of
the mind's full resources, conscious and preconscious

,

logi-

cal and associative, univocal and metaphorical.

But how to ask such powerful questions?

F.

Synectics
The two fundamental works of the mind are the crea-

ting

(E

<

>

M)

and the communicating

(

(|;

)

M
out of the othei>/ise random flow of experience.

of meanings

The tool

used in both works is metaphor.
The fundamental work of education, then, is to help

students to create and to communicate their own meanings.

In

order to be helpful in those two works, education has essentialJ.y only one thing to do:

to ask the questions that will
«

open up the mind to metaphor.
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Synectics Education Systems has, to my
knowledge,

worked out the only thoroughly practical,
teachable, concrete approach to liberating, in a structured

but not con-

fining way, the resources of the metaphormaking preconscious
mind.
That is another way of saying that the
Synectics

approach does what Postman and Weingartner say
should be
done:

it asks the kinds of questions that increase
the

learner's will to learn, and joy in learning, and
confidence;
that help him to make fresh inquiries, explore
alternatives,

define his own way of approaching problems; and so on.

What

Postman and Weingartner are implicitly asking for -- what

virtually all modern critics are implicitly asking for

what Synectics seems to give:

—

is

a way to ask the questions

that liberate rather than constrict the mind, the questions

that invite metaphoric explorations rather than demand

sterile recall.
The most important assumption implicit in the Synec-.

tics understanding of the mind is that all meanings are

relative.

There is nothing so true, so absolute, that it

cannot be looked at another way.

perfectly expressive.
only possible context.
able.

No expressive metaphor is

No contextual metaphor sets up the

Everything is literally question-

"Truth" and "meaning" do not reside in the thing seen

but in the way the thing is seen, and that angle of vision
is alterable.

Meanings can fall apart and reassemble in
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different combinations.

And that is what they must do if

we are ever to go beyond any status quo
whatever, psychological, moral, political, technological, scientific,
re-

ligious, artistic, educational.
SES starts from an extremely simple view of how
the mind works.

Confronted with something new, the mind

tries to understand it by reducing it to something already
known.

SES calls this Making the Strange Familiar.

But

co^f^oi^ted with the need to go beyond what it already knows,

to get a more useful hold on it

,

the mind has to shake off

its habitual attitudes and adopt new viewpoints.

this Making the Familiar Strange.

SES calls

Both processes result in

understanding, but the first results in what is normally
called "learning," while the second results in what is nor-

mally called "creativity."

These labels are useful, but

it should be pointed out that "learning" -- connecting the
unknov;n to the known -- is a highly creative act,

"creativity" -- approaching old things in new ways

and that

—

is

very much an act of learning.

Connecting one thing to another is making metaphor,
regardless of v/hich thing is "strange" or which "familiar."
The tool both of learning and of creativity is therefore metaphor.

The most important contribution of SES to both processes

is that,

instead of leaving them -to chance as education has all

but universally done, it gets deliberate about them.

SES

.
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asks the kinds of questions that naturally
and easily put '
the mind into a condition appropriate for
creative learning.
Synectics says that by deliberate, conscious use
of metaphor,

one can control how familiar to us one thing will
seem and
how strange another will seem.
can manipulate our view

^

o^ reality

^ manipulating

our minds

,

and we can manipulate

oi^ minds by manipulating the metaphors it sees through,
and
can manipulate our metaphors by asking questions that lead

^

us from old ones to new ones

To my knowledge the Synectics work on metaphor is the

only one which approaches it as something that can be deliber-

ately cultivated.

SES distinguishes three m.echanisms of

metaphor:

Direct Analogy, Personal Analogy, and Compressed

Conflict.

They are distinguished according to what kinds of

things are being compared in each, and what mental state is

being induced in each.

The kinds of questions Postman and

Weingartner want us all to ask are, in my opinion, the questions that evoke one or other of these metaphoric processes.

"DIRECT ANALOGY is a simple comparison of two objects
or concepts:

'A

crab walks sideways like a sneaky burglar'....

the subject of the analogy is the first part of the comparison
'a crab'.

The analogue of the analogy is the thing to which the

subject is compared --

'a

burglar'.

Experimenting with

^^VJilliam J. J. Gordon, The Metaphorical Way of
Learning and Knowing (Cambridge, Mass.: Porpoise Books,
p".
18.
1971)
,

—

)
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comparisons between any two objects or concepts, the mind
is
in a psychological state of speculation, a condition
of free-

dom and detachment.

"The mind will not speculate on command;

but when a person is asked,

'vVhat

animal is like a steam

roller?' he is put into the psychological state of speculation.

V7hen the

person begins to analyze the analogue, he is

put in the state of being detached from, in this example, the

steam roller

It should be observed that this is a con-

^

dition of pure speculation for as long as it lasts.

The di-

rect analogies are being invented purely for their own sakes,

apart from immediate utility.

Accordingly, the mind most

likely comes up with several possible analogies, and only

after its free-form, purely subjective speculation is over

will it begin to consider which analogy introduces the desired Strangeness or Familiarity of viewpoint.
The second mechanism of metaphor distinguished by SES
is Personal Analogy,

"a description of how it feels to iden-

tify with a person, a concept, a plant or animal, or a non-

living thing.

The new

element in this kind of analogy

is that- "I" am one of the terms of the comparison

—

my

feelings, movements, etc., are the analogue to which some-

thing else is being compared, or vice versa.

The more pro-

found my identification with the other, the more genuine the

Personal Analogy is.

2^Tony Poze, "Rethinking Synectics Training,"
(unpublished.
^

^Gordon, ibid., p.

21.

p.

4.

^

^

.
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Here, emotion is considered to be a fundamental

form of knowledge.

—

The world

understood emotionally.

or some piece of it

—

is

Wliether one invests external

reality with emotion or emotion with external reality, the
same two realms of being are brought together.
is reminded,

The reader

for example, of Einstein's use of Personal

Analogy in working out the fundamental concepts of his
Personal Analogy is central to any

relativity theories.

kind of problem-solving.

By putting himself inside a pro-

blem, by feeling it out, identifying with some aspect of it,
one gains the kind of intense and immediate subjective involve-

ment that can yield the most pov/erful insights.
The third and subtlest of the SES metaphoric mechanisms is Compressed Conflict, "a poetic, two-word description
on a high level of generality where the two words don't seem
to fit and sometimes actually contradict each other.

For

instance, a Compressed Conflict description of cellophane
tape is imiprisoned freedom

.

.

.

.this expression reflects inter-

The psychological state induced by the

nal conflict.

conscious use of Compressed Conflict is "Deferment and Toleration of the Apparently Irrelevant; here the mind operates in
a

state of flux... of deferred judgment.

^

2

Ibid
^Poze

.

,

,

p

.

26

ibid.

^

.
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The importance of Compressed Conflict
lies in its

ability to put the mind into a state of dynamic
tension, hence
in its ability to help the mind see things
vitally rather
than statically.

Here, everything is seen to be constituted

of elements or principles in an exquisite
tension, which is

the source of what they are and what they do.

To understand

things on such a level is to understand them in the
deepest

way
Just as a Direct Analogy can be anywhere from very

obvious to very novel, and a Personal Analogy can be anywhere
from slightly involved to highly emphatic, so there is a range

possibilities in Compressed Conflict.

The simplest form

of Compressed Conflict is a straight-out contradiction, as
in the example of "imprisoned freedom" used by Gordon above.

The subtler form is paradox; Gordon uses the example of "pro-

toplasmic kiss,"

a

phrase used by a neurologist to describe

how the nerve endings might meet.
One will notice that in each of the three mechanisms
SES has distinguished, the original idea of Familiarity and

Strangeness can be found.

The idea is that, with practice

and training, one can deliberately control Direct Analogy,

Personal Analogy, and Compressed Conflict either to make the
strange familiar or to make the familiar strange

—

either

to "learn" or to "create." .The art of asking questions
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Weingartner is the art of evoking one or other of

the kinds of metaphors.
By the deliberate manipulation of the three kinds
of metaphor SES has for the first time formalized an approach
to the preconscious elements of thought -- and that, po-

tentially, in all fields.

The application is simple enough.

In general, it involves stating literally and accurately

what one wants to deal with, and then working out from its
core element into a Direct Analogy of some sort; the Direct

Analogy then becomes internalized through Personal Analogy,
which in turn is then reduced to the two words of a Compressed Conflict.

From the Compressed Conflict we go to

some more concrete Direct Analogy which exemplifies it,
and from this last analogy work our way back to the original

business, borrowing from the analogue whichever of its

elements seem to have a payload to offer.

The v/hole proc-

ess involves both rational and nonrational factors, as any

kind of fertile thinking does.

But here the nonrational,

emotional, fantasy elements are separated out, formalized,
and deliberately manipulated, at the same time that they

remain perfectly free.
But perhaps examples of the metaphoric process in

action will compliment this abstract discussion of it.
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The Nuns and the Police
The examples

I

wish to cite of the metaphorical

approach come from two personal experiences of mine
during
the past year.

One was with a group of Roman Catholic nuns

in San Francisco,

the other with a group of police officers

from Western Massachusetts.

The work with the nuns took

the form of a week-long workshop on the relationships
among

religion, psychology

and education.

,

The work with the

police was a year-long course in English Composition.

Cen-

tral to both was an exploration of metaphor.

The sisters all belonged to the same Order but were

teaching in different schools.

They shared a profound dis-

couragement over the educational aims and methods preferred
in

the schools where they were teaching, and obtained per-

mission from their superiors to study out together what an
alternative school might be.

conceptualizing such

a

If they were successful in

school clearly enough, it was hinted,

they might also receive permission actually to set it up
as an experiement to be underwritten by the Order.

These

sisters had reached an impasse in their thinking about

schools and wanted some input from someone else to get them

started again.
The three of us who were conducting the workshops -a psychologist,

a

priest, and myself -- felt there was indeed

an impasse somewhere, but we could not at first see where
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It was.

After some confusion we decided to try
to explore
some metaphors of education with the sisters.
They them-

selves had tried, unsuccessfully, to do this by
viewing

education as a process of artistic creation.
V7ith that

The problem

metaphor was that none of the sisters was her-

self an artist, and the only notions any of them had of

artistic creativity were amorphous and came at second hand.
We noticed, though, that the sisters also used other meta-

phors when speaking of education, unconsciously to be sure,
and quite spontaneously.

mind, of

They spoke of "cultivating" the

planting" ideas, of the "production line" mood

of classrooms,

of the "cell block" construction of most

school buildings, of the teacher's "parental" role, etc.
Here were metaphors galore:
as prison,

as family.

school as garden, as factory,

We decided to try one of the meta-

phors more thoroughly, and chose the garden.

because of its familiarity

(as

applied to education, it

dates at least back to Rousseau)

ble religious overtones

We chose it

,

(we had in

and because of its possi-

mind the Garden of Eden)

We asked the sisters to forget about schools for a while
and to talk

about gardens, gardeners, gardening.

We felt

that a thorough exploration of the sisters' feelings and
ideas about gardens would, in the end, say a great deal

about their real feelings and ideas about education.

.

148

The idea did not work.

get about education.

The nuns could not for-

They kept translating everything

they were saying about gardens back into
school talk, thus

choking the metaphor.

They were in effect not talking about

schools as gardens, but about gardens as schools.
not stop them from doing this.

I

We could

was on the verge of throw-

ing the garden metaphor out and trying another one,
when
the psychologist among us observed that it was not
a meta-

phor that was failing here, but metaphor as such.
group for some reason could not to do what
them to do.

I

This

had been asking

They could not make a metaphor for education.

But why not?

After some very painful explorations, it turned out
that the sisters could not deal with education metaphorically

because, for them, education itself already was

a metaphor.

They were not interested in schools as such, but in something

else that schools and school reforms had

figuratively in their minds.

com.e

to stand for

When they said, "Schools are

dull, uncreative, deadly, sterile," they actually meant,
"My life is dull, uncreative, deadly, sterile." When they spoke
of reforming the schools, they meant reforming their own

lives.

When they spoke of trying new ways of teaching they

really meant trying new ways of living.

We had not been able

to get the sisters to do metaphor because they were already

busy doing it, but did not realize it.

Our job, oddly
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enough, turned out to be to get them to stop
doing metaphor

,

or rather

,

to become conscious of doing it and to
con-

trol the metaphoric process lest it control them.
The experience with the police is summed up, in my

mind, by one word;
and

I

"turtles."

Some forty-five policemen

had spent several months of weekly meetings exploring

various uses of metaphor and playing with their possibilities.
At first there was some resistance, but it came mostly out
of discomfort with something unfamiliar rather than out of

outright disapproval or rejection.

We started by using some

of the Synectics materials to loosen up the imagination, and

after a little getting acquainted the policemen had fun with
such bogglers as:

"Wiiat

mud or midnight?"

"You are the world's greatest inventor.

color is sleep?"

"Which is softer,

From what animal did you get the idea for the wheel?

vacuum cleaner?"^®

for the

The policemen realized after a while that

the importance of such questions did not lie in their apparent

silliness, but in the way they had of freeing the imagination
and the feelings.

There were no right and wrong answers here,

only more or less intriguing ones.

Consequently it became pos-

sible to talk of and to experiment fairly broadly with Expressive and Contextual Metaphor.
One day toward the end of the course we were doing

some purely analytical work, and had said nothing about

^

S leep ?
william J. J. Gordon, V?hat Colo^
passim
Porpoise Books, iTfT)
(Cambridge, Mass.:
2

8

,

.

.
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metaphors

I

had asked the policemen to state in propo-

sitional form thirty-five distinct problems they
faced in
their profession
not other people's problems, but their
own.

They were then to pick out of that list the five
or

six they individually felt were the most important.

They

then were to boil those down to one over-arching master

problem, that contained or caused most of the others.

was intended as an exercise in analysis and logic.

This

When we

were trying to find the one core problem we had considerable
difficulty and almost abandoned the effort.
at that point blurted out,

"Turtles!"

But one man

No one in the room

guffawed, called him an idiot, shouted obscenities, swore

—

the range of things they could usually be counted on to do

when confronted with a strange idea, especially if it came
from a colleague.

Instead, they all turned to the man and

waited for him to explain.

One man did net v;ait.

He just

said, "That's right!"

The man who had thrown turtles into the conversation has, by his

ov/n

admission, never been particularly

skillful in the use of language.

Everyone in the room knew

that, and waited for him to explain himself.

one sentence in explanation:
soft."

I

"We're hard because we're

had never before seen such instantaneous and

unanimous agreement in a classroom as

I

saw in the roar

of agreement that followed on that one remark.
'^;c

He said only

Here was

-core problem -- what to do with one's vulnerabilities

^
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and the man with the metaphor had found it for everyone.

The discussion turned to the different kinds of softness
these men felt, both good and bad softnesses, and the differ-

ent kinds of hardnesses they threw up around them, both
good and bad, appropriate and inappropriate hardnesses.
The metaphor gave everyone a framework within which to

organize and express their experience.

What happened with the nuns and with the police
suggests something of the range and potential importance of
the metaphoric approach.

Let us now consider the matter a-

gain, but on a more general level.

H

.

Teaching and Learning
We speak of "a teacher" "teaching" "a subject" "to

students."

What does each term mean?

Let us start with

"a subject":

what is it?

tainly not something given a priori by the nature of
It is a human invention, and is alterable.

Cer-

tilings.

It is what the

in it, say
group of people vitally interested in it, active

it is.

an area agreed
It is the focus of a common concern,

their survival, developby some people to be important for
Physics, for example, is simply whatever
ment, or comfort.

not vice versa.
physicists do; physicists define physics,
exclude from
physicists, in either wisdom or folly,
Likewise art is what
physics is by that fact not physics.

VJhat

product of their interest,
artists do: it is the collective
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involvement, and work.

Art is not something pre-existing

and independent that then defines who
is and who is not an
artist.
It IS the artist
or better, the whole community
of artists
that define what art is, and they define
it

—

—

by doing it.

Thus,

"a subject" is the area of interest

and labor common to those who say they are its
practitioners.

People become practitioners of something because
they feel
it matters for their survival, development, or
comfort.
It organizes their experience in a useful way.

nition of "a subject" is:

E

<

>

The defi-

M.

What, then, is "a teacher"?

He is only one of the

practitioners of a subject, one of those for whom this general area of interest and labor is important in some way
for survival, development, or comfort.

The difference be-

tween a teacher and other practitioners of

a

subject is

that the teacher is interested mostly, or largely, in people

who are not yet practitioners of it but who might become
And "a student"?

A student is

a

so.

person who might be,

or who is becoming, a practitioner of a subject (or subjects).
He is one who is trying to sort out what is important for

his own survival, development, or comfort, and who looks for

people who can help him in that work.

He is exploring his

experience by exploring the metaphors that might serve to
structure or prestructure it.
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Thus, the difference between a student and a

teacher is very small.

And the distinction between them

and those who are the professional embodiments of what we

conventionally call "subjects" is smaller still.

They are

all people who have structured, or are structuring, and

are pre-structuring their more or less shared experiences
by means of more or less shared metaphors, and who are

helping each other in the enterprise:

And that is all that is meant when one says "a teacher"
"teaches" "a subject" to "students."

There is, then, one overriding question that sums
up all the central questions of teaching:

How helpful are the M's through v/hich the

^ express

>

(

a subject <
/

Or,
a)

prestructure
communicate

/

of

their E?

)

<

y practitioners
teachers
students
\
/
v
X

n

^

to break it down furthers

What are the E's of the

x
^practitioners )
? teachers
f
students
[
j

of a subject,

where and why

and to what extent do they overlap?

Note that the question could be broken

diverge?

down further by reducing E to the formula:
(G

<

>

0

<

En)

<

>

R.

:

b)

What are the M's of the

practitioners
teachers
students

of a

subject, and to what extent do they overlap?

wher

and why diverge?

How usefully do they express
>) the
Are there alternatives to them?
(

How usefully do they prestructure (<
the E? Are there alternatives to them?

)

Hew useful are they in the communications
(sp) among the practitioners, teachers,
students?
c)

How can we manipulate the M's to

better

the E's?

The metaphoric mechanisms discovered by Synectics
seem to offer the most promise here.
These, then, are the questions to which an education
for metaphor and by metaphor would have to address itself.

I

.

Aims of an Education of Metaphor

A curriculum designed to encourage and develop the
processes of metaphoric thought would have four aims
1.

To prepare students for metaphoric- thought by
systematically "stocking" their imaginations
with the kinds of images that have the greatest potential of being useful as analogies;

2.

To prepare students for applied metaphoric
thought, by first systematically encouraging
them to make metaphor-f or-its-own-sake without
reference to the solution of specific problems;
this is to develop the capacity to fantasize
freely but in a controlled way;

,

,

;
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3.

To use the process of metaphoric
thought
in virtually any subject area, as
both a
tool for releasing the creative potential
of the students
and as a tool for developing their ability to analyze the work
of
others
,

4.

To develop in the students the ability to
detect and to criticize any use of metaphor
which is weak, or misleading, or unconscious,
or in any other way inadequate.

These objectives are stated here in order of logical
priority, not necessarily pedagogical priority.

It may, for

example, be better for the purposes of actual teaching to
go
ahead and "make metaphor" without waiting for the students
to have a wide range of experiences and images to draw on.
It might be better to encourage a critical attitude before

encouraging

a

creative one.

These are matters which would

be handled differently in different subjects and at differ-

ent levels.

Still, all four objectives are simultaneously

important, and ought, in some way, to be simultaneously pursued.

We will outline each of the four objectives in turn.
It should be clear, however, that we are trying to establish
a

general pattern of approach; in no way do the following

pages constitute even a sketchy handbook for department
chairmen.

For that reason, they are all but devoid of re-

ferences to specific disciplines.

Very probably the approach

could be used in almost any discipline -- not only in the
liberal arts, where its relevance might be more obvious.

156

But the truth of that assertion could be established
only

after a good deal more consultation and experiment than

anyone has yet done.
THE FIRST AIM:

Stocking the Imagination

The imagination is constantly being supplied with raw

materials.

But the supplying is often sporadic and selec-

tive, too much limiited by the individual's immediate interests

and by his environment.

The school ought to intervene to

make sure, as far as possible, that students have seen much,
and have stored much.
The kind of seeing involved here requires a quasi-

scientific accuracy, but of itself it is not scientific; it
is not to serve as the basis for elaborate systems of class-

ification, nor as raw materials for the making of hypotheses.
The emphasis here is on noting well the structures and func-

tions of many things, these being the dimensions of things

that will be most useful in metaphoric thought.
Of course anything might be used in a metaphor.

The

problem here is to concentrate on the kinds of things that
most likely will function there, and will be of the greatest
use. We suggest three areas for such observation:

the yearly seasons, the
The cycles of nature.
day,
the tides, the weather,
solar
the
month,
lunar
We know that
evolution.
of
perhaps even the cycles
important
an
such things have universally been
source of metaphor in literature and painting, where
they are often used to express subjective emotional
We know, too, that the cyclical nature
states.
of these phenomena has a powerful appeal to the
1.

.

,
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mind, and is frequently influential (usually in
a concealed way) in the formulation of myths,
theories of history interpretations even of
economics and politics, patterns of psychological development, and common sense judgements of
experience
,

2.
Life forms
Each life form, and every part
of every life form, is the "answer" to a set
of practical "problems."
Looking at as wide
a variety of organisms as possible in order
to isolate (a) the problems they have confronted and (b) the structural and functional
forms they have evolved for solving them, is
potentially of great value in the metaphoric
solution of human problems.
Many technical
or pragmatic problems can be and have been
profitably seen as analogous to natural
ones, and even human ethical and political
systems are to some extent based on analogies with "natural order. " Artists too -whether realistic or not in their styles -have generally dra\\?n on natural life forms
to help solve some of their own specifically
.

aesthetic problems.
The
Non- life forms, and machines
3.
structures and functions of matter in its
almost endless combinations, whether macroor micro-cosmic, whether of natural or human
design, supply probably the clearest and
most accessible images of cause- and-ef feet
Such things,
and of structural patterns.
of course, are fundamental in the making
of useful metaphors.
.

A fourth area could be added except that
listing it among the others gives the impression that it is only one among several.
It is the
It is too far-reaching for that.
To the
dimension of the psychological.
extent feasible, attention ought to be
paid in all three of the areas mentioned
above to psychological analogues of the
structures and functions of the things
To notice such analogues
being studied.
is already to be dealing in metaphor;
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it S0Gms 3 piomisiri^ 3nd ©f f iciGnt
way of developing a psychological awareness in students without isolating the
inner emotional life from the rest of
experience -- an isolation too often
unwittingly encouraged by the separate
study of psychology.
_

It should be stressed again that the sustained observation of

structures and functions which we are suggesting here has only
a logical priority in the development of metaphoric skills.

Making such observations is a habit of mind that needs to be
constantly encouraged, used, and increased.

A curriculum

designed to develop metaphoric skills would probably include
special sections on "stocking the imagination" at every phase
and level, in an ascending order of precision and sophistication.

THE SECOND AIM;

Making Metaphors

Although metaphors are basically tools for getting
v-7ork

done, they are also play-things

as such.

,

and should be encouraged

Fantasy is something that ought to be engaged in

simply because it is there, and, regardless of whether we

officially value it or not, it does and alv/ays will take up
a lot of time and a lot of energy.

It seems better to ac-

knowledge and take advantage of so determined

a thing,

rather

than to mount futile campaigns to be rid of it.
If,

then, the first objective is to stock the imagin-

ation, the second is simply to use it for its own sake.

:

;
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In encouraging the making of metaphors

,

one ought

not to give priority to any specific kind; one ought,
however, to try to make sure the students experiment broadly.

A teacher could make sure that such experiments were taking
place, by asking students to make all of the following

kinds of comparisons
1.

compare the inorganic to

the inorganic
the organic
'the psychological

compare the organic to

the inorganic
-the organic
the psychological

the inorganic
compare the psychological to — the, organic
^the psychological

compare things that are "obviously" similar;
compare things that are not "obviously" similar,
compare things for comic effect;
compare things for serious effect.
4.

compare things for stylistic purposes;
compare things for purposes of deeper
understanding.

5.

make comparisons that are functionally
insignificant
make comparisons that are functionally
significant.

The value of

1.

is practice in crossing lines of

demarcation between the various classes of things

,

a

habit

essential to creative metaphor.
The value of

2.

is practice in what the Synectics

people call Making the Familiar Strange, and Making the
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Strange Familiar, i.e., practice in controlling
the
degree of newness one introduces into his
perspective

through his choice of metaphors.
The value of

3

.

is practice in the literary and

^^tistic effects inherent in many metaphors.
The value of

4

.

is practice in distinguishing be-

tween style (grace, cleverness, charm) and thought (comprehension, problem-solving).
The value of

5.

is practice in evaluating the

intellectual payload of individual metaphors.
The purposes here, besides the sheer generating of

metaphors

,

is gradually to build in the students an aware-

ness of the range of metaphoric usuage, and a control of

that range.
This purpose can be helped along by occasionally

studying metaphors in selected literary works (and nonverbal metaphors in other arts) that would illustrate the

various uses and types.

But the real emphasis should not

be on the study of other people's metaphors, so much as on

the creation of one's own.
THE THIRD AIM:

Using Metaphors

This, really, is the chief aim.

What is proposed here is the consistent and systematic use of metaphoric thought in at least some phases of

.
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virtually any subject (excluding subjects that aim for
purely manual or physical skills)
Every subject can be, and should be, reduced to
a

series of problems, rather than, as has been traditional

and all but universal, to a series of principles.

The

principles of a subject emerge naturally enough through the
sustained attempt to solve the problems the subject is
addressed to.

Dealing with

a

subject in a problem- and

metaphor-oriented way would lead to some such process
as the following:
1.

The teacher and students isolate the problem,
and reduce it to the briefest statement possible.
If it is their own problem, the students are called on to be creative in solving
it, while if it is someone else's they are
called on to be analytic and critical of the
other person's definition and solution of it.
In either case, the isolation and the statement of the problem should generally be put
into writing by the students.

2.

Once the problem is clearly stated, the
teacher begins the metaphoric process, in
whichever of the following ways is appropriate:
a.

He suggests an analogue, and gets the
students to explore it and apply it to
The teacher's purpose here
the problem.
would be mainly to get his students into
the metaphoric process for the sake of
Or:
practice.

b.

He helps the students to come up with
their own metaphors and to explore them.
To do this, he would have to draw on the
student's own imaginative resources,
and on the types of metaphor-making
mentioned above in connection with the
Or:
2nd aim.

/
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He helps the students to study,
analyze, and criticize the metaphors
used by someone else in the solution of
the problem at hand.
The students
should be encouraged to explore alternative metaphors on their own, as
in a. and b. above.
c.

In any of th-ese approaches,

the teacher:

has to make sure that the metaphors
come from a wider and wider range of
experience as time goes on; and,
a.

has to make sure that the students
stay with a given metaphor a sufficiently
long time to explore it thoroughly, and
to follow out whatever associations come
to mind because of it in the course of
discussion.
He might, incidentally, be
able to encourage the students to regard
some of the analogues as things- to-bestudied in their own right; and/

b.

he should encourage the students to
find as many alternative metaphors as they
can, and as seem useful; and/
c.

he should encourage the students to
do as much writing as seems reasonable,
to express the process they are involved
in and the product they come up with.

d.

3.
Once the metaphoric dimension has been explored,
the teacher helps the students to make use of it in
solving the original problem:

a.
by lining up the elements of the metaphor
with the elements of the problem; and/

by transferring information from the
metaphor to the problem; and
b.

by deciding for or against prior solutions
to the problem; and
c.

/

.
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by making actual use of the resolution
the problem in an artistic, technical,
or
philosophic way
whichever suits the
nature of the original task.
d.

—

THE FOURTH AIM:

Criticizing Bad Metaphor

This aim involves practice in judging the useful-

ness of particular metaphors that have been made by others.
1.
In the study of mythology, comparative religion,
sj^thropology
and of the arts related to these,
students should be using the criteria to determine
which problems the great myths have helped solve,
and how, and which problems they either created
or simply failed to solve.
Among other things,
such an investigation would help students to
clarify their own values and standards.
,

2.
Students should be encouraged to track down
the hidden metaphors current in popular culture,
advertising, politics, entertainment.
This
activity is closely related to that of the
semanticists and many of their books could be
helpful here.
Such an excercise would help
students to clarify their own values and standards.
,

3.
In the study of psychology (and of literary
and artistic works that are psychological in
their orientation)
students should look for
and evaluate the conscious and unconscious
images that determine value and even control
behavior.
,

4.
Much attention should be paid to the study
of the biographies of the great men of, e.g.,
science and politics, in an effort to uncover
and evaluate the metaphoric images that
were instrumental in their discoveries or

policies
Implied throughout is the matter of standards, values,
norms.

The only values which we are implying, and the only

ones

would

v/e

v;ish

actually to teach, are these:

;
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1.
It is better to be conscious than unconscious
about the metaphoric images that control one's
thought, define his values, and determine his

behavior

It is better to be deliberate than automatic
in the use of such images, and to take responsibility for where they lead one in action and behavior;
2.

3.
A metaphor ought to be freshly chosen each time
it is used, lest by being repeated it come automatically to seem right, and become less and less
conscious, less and less deliberate, and more
and more in automatic control of one's attitude
and behaviors.

Beyond that, we do not wish so much to teach
what is valuable or true, as to teach that values
and judgments of truth do exist, that they are
implied in the images that structure our mental
world, and that the selection of those images can
be both defended and criticized on a purely pragmatic basis.
The suggestions outlined here ar^e
posited on the assumption that all these matters
not relative in the sense that
are relative
no judgment can be made of them, but relative
in the sense that any judgment must be based on
the appropriateness of a specific image to a
specific problem.
The problems come first,
and the images we construct to deal with them
make no sense apart from them.

—

J.

Conclusion
Our purpose in these pages has not been to write

a

handbook of educational reform.

The focus of attention

has been more on articulating ideas than on outlining programs.

But the ideas themselves are such that they point

to action.

These ideas on the purposes and mechanisms of

metaphor have been developed in part, for their own pure

.
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sake because they are interesting,
but in part too for
their eventual practical payload because
besides being

interesting they are also simple, tough,
useable.
If indeed the mind works by metaphor,
then metaphor
IS what we should be teaching.

if, moreover, there is

nothing esoteric about metaphor

— if

it comes naturally,

if it is fun to do, if it tempts a person into
becoming

subjectively involved in the processes of learning and
creating, if it makes people comfortable with changing

meanings, if it genuinely democratizes knowledge and the
approaches to knowledge, if it puts

with the fullness of his

ov;n

a

person back in touch

individual resources, if it

opens up worlds of discourse among people who differ from

each other -- then metaphor is exactly what we should be

teaching
V-Jhat

besides metaphor should we teach?

point is that everything is included within
is nothing besides

it.

it.

But the
There

It is the process at work through-

out all knowledge, and in all knowers.
the bone and the blood of education.

It is, therefore.

.

.

.
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